Buried in US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s testimony in her confirmation hearing before Congress two weeks ago was a subtle challenge to China wrapped in an evident preface to US President Barack Obama’s emerging policy toward Beijing.
Shortly after, and almost on cue, Beijing published a White Paper on defense that pointed warily to what they saw as an increase in US power in Asia. The US, the White Paper said, has been “consolidating its military alliances, adjusting its military deployment and enhancing its military capabilities” in the Asia-Pacific region.
Clinton, who was confirmed as secretary the day after Obama’s inauguration on Jan. 20, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “We want a positive and cooperative relationship with China.”
She said, however, that “this is not a one-way effort. Much of what we will do depends on the choices China makes about its future at home and abroad.”
In a written report, Clinton answered earlier questions from the committee and elaborated on what the US expects.
“We can encourage them to become a full and responsible participant in the international community — to join the world in addressing common challengers like climate change and nuclear proliferation — and to make greater progress toward a more open and market-based society. But it is ultimately up to them,” she said.
An interesting sequence here: On Jan. 8, then US deputy secretary of state John Negroponte was in Beijing to mark 30 years of Sino-American diplomatic relations, but evidently was not informed of the forthcoming White Paper, which took months to prepare. On Jan. 13, Clinton testified and her written report was made public. On Jan. 20, the Chinese released their White Paper, the same day Obama took office.
In substance, Clinton’s testimony suggested that Obama’s policy toward China would continue that of former president George W. Bush. But the firm tone, challenging China to respond without ambiguity, was new.
Clinton was non-committal on dialogue with Beijing, saying in her written report: “We are looking carefully at the question of how to develop this important engagement with China. We expect high-level engagement to continue in some form.”
However, Clinton was clear on the issues of Taiwan, Tibet and human rights in China.
On Taiwan, Clinton followed precedents set earlier.
“The administration’s policy will be to help Taiwan and China resolve their differences peacefully while making clear that any unilateral change in the status quo is unacceptable,” she said.
The former government of president Chen Shui-bian nudged Taiwan toward independence, while the current government of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has pledged to maintain the “status quo.”
Clinton said the new administration “will speak out for the human rights and religious freedom of the people of Tibet. If Tibetans are to live in harmony with the rest of China’s people, their religion and culture must be respected. Tibet should enjoy genuine and meaningful autonomy.”
Beyond Tibet, Clinton said, the US administration would “press China on our concerns about human rights at every opportunity and at all levels, publicly and privately, both through our mission in China and in Washington.”
In response, China’s White Paper asserted: “Separatist forces working for ‘Taiwan independence,’ ‘East Turkestan independence’ and ‘Tibet independence’ pose threats to China’s unity.” East Turkestan refers to Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang Province.
China, the paper contended, “faces strategic maneuvers and containment from the outside.” US presidents, secretaries of state and defense, commanders of US Pacific forces and US ambassadors in Beijing have sought for much of the last 30 years to persuade Chinese leaders that the US poses no threat, apparently without success.
The White Paper contends: “In particular, the United States continues to sell arms to Taiwan in violation of the principles established in the three Sino-US joint communiques, causing serious harm to Sino-US relations as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.”
The three communiques, of 1972, 1979 and 1982 were intended to define relations between the US and China but have been in dispute from the beginning as the US and China disagree on what they mean. The US, for instance, says they call on China and Taiwan to settle their differences peacefully; Chinese say they retain the right to employ military force to settle the dispute.
Richard Halloran is a writer based in Hawaii.
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