The lights in Beijing’s Olympic sites have been turned off, the drummers and the fireworks have been stilled and Michael Phelps and the other athletes have gone home from the most politicized Olympic spectacle in decades.
Now comes a really trying event: assessing the effect of the Olympics on China itself and on China’s stamina and strategy as a long distance runner in a marathon to see who will dominate Asia.
As Victor Cha, director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, has written: “The Olympics was China’s announcement to the world that it is a global power. But with this prestige comes global responsibilities in foreign policy and in domestic human rights.”
Whether China will live up to those expectations is the primary question of the post-Olympics era.
At first glance, it would seem clear that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tightened its authoritarian grip on power in Beijing. It cracked down on dissent during the Games, allowing no demonstrations despite 77 applications for permits, and it has shown no sign of relenting. Even so, protests against oppressive local rulers persist and Beijing faces continued unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang.
A Chinese journalist visiting Hawaii, Cao Haili, suggested to a luncheon audience at the East-West Center, the research and educational institute in Honolulu, that many people outside of China thought the Olympics would open China to improved human rights.
“China made some effort during the Olympics,” she said, “but it is difficult for China to change overnight. Fundamental change will come only from inside China.”
Nationalism, already a strong force within China, has been enhanced by China’s sleek conduct of the Games and reinforced by China’s garnering of 51 gold medals. The Chinese concentrated their funds and training on individual events such as gymnastics, badminton and riflery, and won only 21 silver and 28 bronze medals.
The US, in contrast, did better in team sports such as basketball, volleyball and soccer, taking the most medals overall, 110. Like most nations, besides China, the medals of the US were fairly evenly distributed with 36 gold, 38 silver and 36 bronze.
Several other journalists from China in Hawaii pointed to a greater sense of confidence among President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and his colleagues in the ruling politburo. They disagreed, however, on whether that confidence would cause China’s leaders to relax their controls gradually or to assume that their insistence on centralized control is best for China.
A critical question is how Beijing’s renewed confidence might affect the politburo’s running struggle to subdue and eventually to take control of Taiwan.
Relations between Taipei and Beijing have warmed up in recent months under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), but an early test will come up when the UN General Assembly convenes tomorrow. Taiwan has asked that it be permitted to “participate” in UN activities and those of its affiliated organizations such as the WHO.
Before, Taiwan asked to join the UN or to become an observer. Each time, China adamantly opposed that arrangement, contending that Taiwan was part of China and that Beijing spoke for Taiwan. This time, US officials said, Washington favors the approach by Taiwan since its skirts the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan. If Beijing blocks Taiwan’s participation, that may indicate that China’s hostility is unabated.
Similarly, another test of China’s attitude will come next month when APEC meets in Peru. In previous years, the Chinese have insisted that only a low-ranking official from Taiwan be allowed to attend. This year, Taiwan will seek to have a high-level official there. China will be watched closely to see if its opposition to Taiwan has eased.
A third test is likely sometime this fall when the US approves a long-awaited arms sale to Taiwan. A series of quiet meetings between senior US officials and those of Taiwan appear to have repaired relations between Washington and Taipei that had been damaged by disagreements over China policy between the Bush administration and the government of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
Beijing will undoubtedly protest the sale, as it always has, but the heat of the protest will indicate whether Beijing has become confident enough to state its objections in a lower key.
Richard Halloran is a writer based in Hawaii.
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