Last Sunday, Hong Kong held elections for its Legislative Council. Of the total of 60 seats, 30 are directly elected in geographical constituencies, while the other 30 are elected in functional constituencies. Public opinion is reflected in the direct elections to the geographical constituencies, while the majority of the smaller functional constituencies are controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Ever since Hong Kong reverted to Chinese rule in 1997 and implemented the “one country, two systems” political system, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy groups have been diminished because they are stifled by the Basic Law and because of China’s United Front strategy, which includes both threats and temptation.
As a result of patriotic education and threats following Beijing’s suppression of the disturbances related to Tibet and the Sichuan earthquake, things did not look too good for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy groups in the 10 days prior to Sunday’s election.
There were even fears that they wouldn’t win the 21 seats required to veto legislation. In the end, they won 23 seats, 19 in the geographical and four in the functional constituencies, three less than in the previous elections, but more than predicted.
There are some lessons to be learned from Sunday’s vote.
First, Beijing’s empty promise to hold general elections has blurred the political agenda. However, Hong Kong’s recent high inflation, the exploded myth that Hong Kong can rely on the Chinese economy, the growing poverty gap, and the ties between government and industry as a result of retired government officials accepting high corporate positions in disregard of conflicts of interest have caused widespread public discontent and made voters support pro-democracy groups.
Second, the biggest loser in Sunday’s elections was the Liberal Party, which represents the industrial and trade sector. The party is basically pro-establishment, although not as strongly so as the pro-China Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, which in 2003 supported the passage of laws complying with the controversial Article 23 of the Basic Law, which requires the government to enact laws against treason, sedition, subversion and theft of national secrets.
The Liberal Party suffered a major defeat in the geographical constituency elections. Apart from pointing to political polarization, the reason was the negative impact of ties between political and industrial circles and the lack of grassroots support.
Third, the rise of the pro-democracy League of Social Democrats (LSD) is worth some attention. They were only established two years ago and have become known for being “radical.” They support the middle and lower classes, and are clearly opposed to the CCP. They first made themselves noticed in last year’s district council elections. In this year’s legislative elections, they increased their number of seats from two to three.
Wong Yuk-man (黃毓民) is the charismatic LSD leader — he has always fought the CCP, is well spoken and dares attack his opponents. All these traits got him elected by a landslide.
However, his criticism of more moderate members of the pro-democracy camp stole some votes from them, and he caused the Civic Party representative in his district to fail to get elected. Lau Chin-shek (劉千石), a former pro-democracy activist, received even fewer votes by siding with the CCP. This shows that the opposition between democracy and dictatorship remains the focus of Hong Kong politics, and also that opposition between social classes is increasing, which is something new.
Paul Lin is a political commentator.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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