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Give up the UN bid, it’s hopeless

‘China will become more cautious if Ma talks about a diplomatic truce while stabbing China in the back. Any diplomatic truce or international participation can only rely on China’s goodwill because Taiwan has no bargaining chips.’

Praising his concept of “diplomatic truce,” President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) embarked on his first state visit on Aug. 12. On the 15th, while Ma was still overseas, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the country’s 17 diplomatic allies had submitted a proposal to the UN Secretariat titled “Need to Examine the Fundamental Rights of the 23 Million People of the Republic of China [Taiwan] to Participate Meaningfully in the Activities of the United Nations Specialized Agencies,” to be put on the provisional agenda of the 63rd session of the General Assembly as a supplementary item.

This move has undoubtedly challenged China.

Since the two referendums held in tandem with this year’s presidential elections failed to pass, the ministry should not have pushed forward any bids to participate in the UN this year if Ma wanted to show respect for either the Referendum Law (公民投票法) or public opinion. The referendums would have let Ma off the hook. But shouldn’t he care about the fate of the UN proposal?

Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) sincerely responded to the aspirations of Taiwanese to participate in international organizations by appointing diplomat Wang Yi (王毅) as chairman of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). However, this solution involves a number of political and legal factors, so both sides of the Taiwan Strait need time for political adjustment.

Last month, the TAO organized a symposium in Hangzhou, China, on the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. At the forum, Wang exchanged opinions with Taiwanese academics and proposed four ways of resolving cross-strait issues: working together, creating opportunities, consulting each other and gradually solving the problems.

It is rather difficult to create a comprehensive diplomatic truce or to enhance Taiwan’s international participation since both concern conflicting political stances and interests.

Thus, one side should not unilaterally put forth a proposal and force the other side to accept it without prior negotiations.

Now that Beijing has given an inch by showing its willingness to cooperate on the diplomatic truce, Taiwan wants to take a foot by proposing a bid for participation in the activities of specialized UN agencies without negotiations with China. This move seems to be an attempt to force Beijing’s acceptance.

While the Chinese government is thinking hard about how to both solve the problem and prevent possible negative consequences, Taiwan cannot expect Beijing to accept the move without protest.

Furthermore, Taiwan should not only take its own interests into account and try to push China around. This makes Wang’s suggested approach look even more reasonable.

But since the proposal has been submitted, what should we expect China to do?

China has but two options. First, since Hu has expressed his willingness to discuss Taiwan’s international participation, he could show his sincerity by allowing the proposal to be put on the agenda. Second, China could kill the proposal in the General Committee as it has done with Taiwan’s previous bids to “participate in” or “join” the UN.

Judging on past practice, China will feel forced to adopt the second approach.

The reasons for this are simple.

If China were to allow the bill to enter the General Assembly agenda, it would have to face the risk of the bill being passed. The UN specialized agencies are independent from one another and are not bound by the UN, so a UN resolution would not be a master key for opening the door to any specialized agency.

However, if the bill were to pass, it would bring China endless trouble and it does not conform to China’s consistent standpoint.

In addition, because the international community accepts the “one China” principle, cross-strait issues are regarded as internal affairs that should not be discussed on the international negotiation table.

Even if China were to block the bill, it would not affect Hu’s credibility, as Taiwan’s international participation could still be discussed under the “one China” framework.

What does Taiwan stand to benefit from pushing this proposal? Nothing at all.

Not only is the bill bound to fail, but cross-strait tensions — which have only just begun to show signs of easing — will flare up again in the UN General Committee meeting.

China will become more cautious if Ma talks about a diplomatic truce while stabbing China in the back. Any diplomatic truce or international participation can only rely on China’s goodwill because Taiwan has no bargaining chips.

Even domestically, the pan-green camp does not appreciate the proposal and has lashed out at Ma for downplaying Taiwan’s role in the international arena.

Therefore, we must ask question the wisdom of Ma and his administration in pushing forward this proposition.



Chang Ling-chen is a professor emeritus of political science at National Taiwan University.

TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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