US ‘has the goods’ on Ma
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in an interview with the Wall Street Journal on June 19 that while “encouraging the Chinese and the Taiwanese to try to improve cross-strait relations,” she wanted to “remind everybody that the US has a relationship with Taiwan ... and that the US also wants to make sure that China understands that it’s not just provocative behavior on the part of Taiwan that the US opposes, but provocative behavior on the part of China.”
The “relationship,” which she pointedly brought to the attention of everybody, including undoubtedly President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Beijing’s leaders, could be interpreted as a degree of US sovereignty over Taiwan.
Washington prefers to leave the extent of the dominion ambiguous beyond what is defined in the Taiwan Relations Act, which not only outlines US responsibilities but also implies the US’ right to act on these responsibilities.
When she said that “some of the things that [former president] Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) tended to do were just outright provocative ... the referendum was just provocative,” she was ostensibly referring to how he infuriated Beijing.
However, since Chen’s moves were undertaken to strengthen the Taiwanese people’s hold on Taiwan’s sovereignty and diminish the US’ share as a result, she might as well have been describing how the moves irritated Washington.
There is a consistency when following this second line of reasoning to clarify what could be deemed “provocative behavior on the part of China.”
While Washington never “opposes” China’s rhetorical claims about Taiwan, Taiwanese do. That means “behavior on the part of China” that is offensive to Washington, not just to the Taiwanese, could be construed as “provocative,” according to Rice.
Therefore, Rice’s use of the diplomatic lexicon represents a warning to both Ma and Beijing to steer clear of deals that could lead to yielding part or all of Taiwan’s sovereignty, in which Washington has a stake, to China.
This might seem like the first time in a while that Washington needed to remind people of its role in Taiwan. In reality, Washington has made use of that dominion to meddle in Taiwan’s internal politics whenever it saw fit.
It was only as recently as a few months ago that Washington rode shotgun to facilitate Ma’s presidency while simultaneously buying an insurance policy to guard against being crushed alongside him.
Ma’s green card drama unfolded in the final stretch of the presidential campaign. Then, subsequent to a series of meetings between Ma and US officials, all Taiwanese follow-up investigations, official or otherwise, hit a stone wall.
These days, Washington would disclose tidbits from the treasure trove of US green card and naturalization data pertaining to officials of the Ma administration as well as the KMT whenever the US surmises it is necessary to alert Ma that it still has the goods on him.
Washington hence has established a forceful means of persuading Ma to do its bidding other than words from Rice and company. Like other US foreign ventures, this move comes with collateral damage to the host country.
In the current case, Taiwan’s voters might have been bamboozled into electing someone at least morally, if not constitutionally, unfit for the presidency, thereby making a mockery of Taiwan’s democracy.
That would be a very steep and far-reaching price for the Taiwanese people to pay.
Huang Jei-hsuan
Los Angeles, California
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