In March 2005, the national petroleum companies of China, Vietnam and the Philippines signed the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea. For these countries, this represented a move toward jointly developing the resources of the South China Sea in a way that would set former disputes aside. This agreement helped change the reputation of the South China Sea from one of conflict to one of friendliness and peace. Taiwan, however, was excluded from this agreement.
Last April, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) visited Japan and reached a five-point consensus agreement with his hosts on the South China Sea. This agreement saw both parties commit to make the area into a peaceful, cooperative and friendly sea, to develop the area together according to the principle of reciprocity and to jointly develop portions of the area that they can agree on.
Last month, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) visited Japan. He and his hosts released a joint statement on all-round promotion of strategic and mutually beneficial bilateral relations. The two nations reiterated their wish to work together for a peaceful, cooperative and friendly South China Sea. On May 18, they reached an agreement to jointly develop oil fields. Again, Taiwan was excluded from this agreement.
Taiwan has territorial rights, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over islands in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as well as developmental and managerial rights to important resources in these areas. If Taiwan is not included in the cooperative development plans, it will be difficult for the South China Sea and the East China Sea to become truly peaceful and cooperative maritime areas.
In 2002, Taiwan asked to sign the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea when it built airplane runways on Itu Aba Island of the Spratly Islands and has also asked to sign the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
With the recent sinking of a Taiwanese fishing boat near the Diaoyutai (釣魚台) islands, the government must ask for the resumption of talks with Japan on the rights of Taiwanese to fish in the Diaoyutais to show that we are unhappy with having our rights and interests ignored and infringed upon. Such actions are also exactly what Taiwan needs to take in asking for participation in mechanisms for development and management of the East China Sea.
Last week, Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) met with Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林). They discussed joint excavation of natural gas and oil in the waters off Taiwan and China. In terms of areas for cooperation, the two countries are discussing the resumption of an old plan between Taiwan and China’s Chaozhou and Shantou areas. This plan will involve the excavation of offshore oil resources near the Davis Line of the Taiwan Strait. However, media reports have also said that the CPC Corp, Taiwan and China’s National Offshore Oil Corp have signed a joint excavation plan for the Nanjihtao Basin (南日島盆地).
Following the marked improvement in cross-strait relations after Taiwan’s presidential election and given the impact soaring crude oil prices are having on economic growth, energy security is now a main issue in cross-strait relations and an area that Taiwan and China might cooperate on. If the two could also reach agreement on the joint development of oil and natural gas resources in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the East China Sea, this would not only be in line with their economic goals, but would also lead the way to broader cooperation. A development model like this would also benefit peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan would almost certainly welcome such a move.
Hopefully, China’s leaders will also consider the possibility of Taiwan participating in future projects as well as possible modes of participation when they settle the details of East China Sea development with Japan. The national petroleum companies of China, Vietnam and the Philippines signed the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea. If the petroleum companies of China, Taiwan and Japan could sign something like a trilateral cooperative agreement on the development of oil and natural gas resources in the East China Sea, the area would become a peaceful, cooperative and friendly sea for the whole of East Asia. This would be a win-win situation for all three parties in terms of energy security in the Asia-Pacific region, cooperation in the East China Sea and the development of cross-strait relations.
Song Yann-huei is a researcher at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica and a visiting scholar at The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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