Beijing’s warm reception of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) during his visit to China to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) was an attempt to use the KMT-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) platform to relieve pressure on the KMT for government-to-government dialogue and marginalize Taiwan’s democratic supervisory mechanisms. Furthermore, the Chinese government has sought to weaken the Taiwanese government’s ability to control cross-strait policy by winning over various KMT heavyweights individually.
From Beijing’s red-carpet treatment of former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) during his previous visits, to the resumption of Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung’s (江丙坤) delayed visit to China, to the premise that no promises would be made as to when talks between the SEF and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) would resume, two conclusions can be reached.
First, it shows that China will not accept all of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) requests and has established a model for future cross-strait negotiation: Start with a KMT-CCP platform, launch talks between SEF and ARATS and finally pass resolutions in the KMT-dominated legislature.
This model is very similar to how the CCP manages to pass bills that require the co-operation of other parties: Suggestions are made in the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) and endorsed by the CCP, whereupon the National People’s Congress officially announces them. Similarly, suggestions will be made in the KMT-CCP forum, the SEF and ARATS will engage in consultations, and finally the KMT-controlled legislature will pass the resolutions. Such similarity is turning the KMT into mere political consultants.
This model will have a strong impact on Taiwan’s democracy. Not only will the opposition parties struggle in the legislature without having any influence on the process, the public will also have no chance to understand the process through legislative proceedings, because everything has already been decided in the opaque KMT-CCP forum and its legitimacy will only stem from the dominance of the KMT.
Just because the KMT and CCP discuss economic and trade issues today doesn’t mean they will not turn to political issues tomorrow. Given the lack of transparency, the public will have no way of knowing what kind of sacrifices the KMT will be making in return for more international space.
If nothing is done, our sovereignty and democracy will be in grave danger.
Lai I-chung is an executive committee member of Taiwan Thinktank.
Translated by Ted Yang
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