After a roundtable meeting between vice president-elect Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) and Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming (陳德銘) during the Boao Forum last week, the commerce ministry issued a press release that mentioned the “one China” principle. After Siew protested, the Xinhua news agency issued another report about the meeting without any mention of the principle.
Siew’s protest was undoubtably the most important thing he could have done to make up for his huge mistake of traveling to the forum on a “Taiwan compatriot travel document.”
Rampant speculation about Xinhua’s actions have produced all sorts of theories, but they all share the premise that there has been a major change in Chinese policy. This is far from the case.
For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the “one China” principle serves a function similar to the one performed by “Sun Yat-sen’s (孫中山) final words” during Taiwan’s authoritarian era. These words had to be recited out loud at every major event before anything could take place.
When Taiwan and China first started cross-strait talks, interminable discussions took place over whether these contacts were taking place under the pretext of the “one China” principle. In the end, the argument over whether it was “one China with each side having its own interpretation” or “each side expressing their insistence on the one China principle” could not be settled.
Without the equivalent of a “Sun Yat-sen’s final words” for these talks, how would they be able to continue?
China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) finally sent a letter in which it stated that the “one China” principle was unchanged, but negotiations over administrative matters did not touch upon the substance of “one China.” This broke the deadlock and paved the way for agreements to be signed over document notarization, certified mail, a framework for contact between ARATS and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Koo-Wang talks joint accord.
However, in other areas such as resolving maritime affairs disputes and joint efforts in fighting crime, China had often sought to deny Taiwan’s judicial powers through the wording of agreements in order to prop up the “one China” principle.
This blocked any chance for an agreement to be reached and gives lie to former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi’s (蘇起) contention that there was a “1992 consensus” and that the two sides engaged in smooth negotiations.
Because economic and trade affairs were able to avoid touching upon the “one China” principle, Taiwan was able to join the Asian Development Bank, APEC and the WTO. Although Beijing engaged in some minor obstructive tactics, in the end it did not put up any major resistance.
The day that President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) assumed the chairmanship of the Democratic Progressive Party in 2002, Nauru broke off diplomatic relations with Taipei. China sent this gift to Chen in order to test him. Chen, who had advocated downgrading independence rhetoric and announced the “four noes and one not” policy, in fury proclaimed that there was one country on either side of the Taiwan Strait.
China, wary of upsetting cross-strait economic activity, was quick to have then vice premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛) issue a call for direct links to be established as soon as possible. They would not have to be subject to the “one China” precondition. Disputes over whether cross-strait flight routes should be domestic or international could be sidestepped by classifying them as “cross-strait.”
Beijing started preparing for the establishment of direct links, but in the end Chen did not respond and so the matter came to a close.
Because the Boao Forum is non-governmental and only involves economic matters, it does not touch upon affairs dealing with the substance of “one China.” In light of the memorandum sent by ARATS to SEF in 1992, Qian’s 2002 announcement and Taiwan’s WTO entry, there is nothing at all in Xinhua’s removal of the “one China” principle from the commerce ministry’s press release to suggest that Beijing has made any major changes in the way it sees the principle.
China’s fundamental stance is that in political, diplomatic and defense matters, the “one China” principle will always be adhered to and strictly upheld. Economic and administrative matters, on the other hand, can be considered separately.
Of course, the commerce ministry’s careless addition of the “one China” principle and Xinhua’s willingness to correct the mistake is a rarity.
A host of problems occur because it is not always possible to separate economic affairs from the political and diplomatic, yet China continues to try to force that separation. This is what caused the dispute over the downgrading of the official titles of Taiwan’s WTO representative Yen Ching-chang (顏慶章) and other Taiwanese officials which came about as a result of Chinese pressure.
It is because of this difficulty in separation that Xinhua’s removal of the phrase “one China principle” from the Ministry of Commerce’s press release has caused international affairs specialists, whether they are Taiwanese or otherwise, or even Chinese, to offer their clueless interpretations of the significance of the event. Some have even gone so far as to conclude that China has accepted the “one China, two interpretations” position.
We can predict that with cross-strait relations growing ever more complex and intertwined yet with neither side agreeing to the other’s version of reality, the practice of forcefully separating economic and administrative affairs from the political and diplomatic could only make the situation more confusing. It will also give rise to more speculation and perhaps even chaos.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.Translated by James Chen
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