One of the reasons Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) won the presidential election is a considerable number of voters saw him as separate from former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰). Behind Lien stands not only the remnants of the KMT’s old guard, but also Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) “one China” principle.
China let Lien walk down the red carpet when he visited in 2005, and Hu signed a joint communique with him, but this didn’t mean that China liked this perpetual loser; it only meant that Beijing hoped to bring the joint efforts of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) back on track once the KMT returned to power.
Ma has not yet taken office, but already he is being tested.
At the Boao forum last weekend, vice president-elect Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) issued a “16-word statement,” proposing that the two sides “face reality, take sight of the future, shelve disputes and pursue a win-win scenario.”
Hu said he completely agreed. But where does this “16-word statement” come from?
The first part is from the joint communique signed by Hu and Lien when Lien visited China to endorse the “Anti-Secession” Law in 2005. The “face reality, take sight of the future” part is there because Lien, at the time of his visit, had lost two consecutive presidential elections. It was therefore impossible that the Taiwanese government would tolerate the “one China” component of the “Anti-Secession” Law.
Thus, the only option was to join hands with the CCP to block Taiwanese independence and wait until the KMT returned to power. Only then could the two parties begin to cooperate and set their sights on a future “one China.” By using this line from Lien and Hu’s joint communique, Siew showed that he wants to continue Lien’s line and reassure Hu.
The last part of the statement is the creation of Siew and Ma themselves. “Shelve disputes” means concentrating on “one China,” but leaving aside “different interpretations” of what the expression means.
This contradicts statements that Ma made during the presidential election campaign. During the second debate between the two candidates, Ma said: “The ‘1992 consensus’ is ‘one China, different interpretations,’” and that “‘one China’ means ‘the Republic of China.’” But now, “1992 consensus” is taken to mean “one China, with no interpretations” and the term “Republic of China” (ROC) will not be heard outside Taiwan. Naturally Hu was very happy when he heard this, and of course he said that he agreed.
“Pursue a win-win scenario” is simply deceptive language.
Didn’t Ma say that China and Taiwan should take a position of “mutual non-denial?” This expression meant that Hu could interpret China as being the People’s Republic of China, and Ma wouldn’t deny this; Ma meanwhile could interpret China as the ROC, and Hu wouldn’t deny this.
But the reality is different. Hu talks about his interpretation to the whole world, and in the eyes of the world China equals communist China. Ma could only express his interpretation of “one China” being the ROC within Taiwan during the election campaign, but now that he has been elected, he will presumably “shelve the dispute” if he leaves the country and avoids talking about his own interpretation. Is this mutual non-denial? Is this pursuing a win-win scenario?
Although Ma has not yet taken office, he has offered Hu this statement through his vice president and taken a first step down the same road as Lien, a dangerous road that will make Taiwan part of “one China.”
The next step will be personnel selection and concrete action after Ma and Siew take office, so the remnants of the KMT party-state system and “one China” forces under China’s thumb are preparing to move.
They are plotting to have Su Chi (蘇起) — the architect of Lien and Hu’s KMT-CCP communication platform — appointed secretary-general of the National Security Council. Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) has already been named as director of the Straits Exchange Foundation. This would give these people full control of and the ability to integrate Taiwan’s military diplomacy, national security and China strategy in keeping with Lien’s plan to join hands with the CCP against Taiwanese independence.
This means that the manipulations of communist China will move Taiwan from economic and cultural integration toward political and military integration and thus precipitate its downfall.
Ma doesn’t have much time left to rein in his horses and take another look at his national security team and the future direction of Taiwan.
Ruan Ming is a consultant at the Taiwan Research Institute.
Translated by Anna Stiggelbout
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