Chinese National Party (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) obtained more than 7 million votes in the presidential election, scoring a big win over Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷). Having fallen short by 2 million votes, the DPP was, without a doubt, a big loser. Nevertheless, it will soon become clear the biggest winner was the US.
Recently there has been a high level of activity from the White House and State Department. US President George W. Bush immediately sent a congratulatory note to Ma upon his victory. The White House also released, through the State Department, the contents of a telephone conversation between Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) in which the term “1992 consensus” was used in their discussions about Taiwan.
In their conversation, the concensus was defined as room for different interpretations of “one China,” echoing the wording of the KMT’s phrase “one China with each side having its own interpretation.” At the same time, the White House announced that it was considering the possibility of Ma visiting the US before his inauguration and sent American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt to Taipei for some more shuttle diplomacy.
These carefully timed actions look like what transpired in 2000 when president-elect Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was preparing his “four noes and one not” speech before assuming office. The difference is that in 2000 the concern was over suppressing the DPP’s pro-independence leanings by providing assurances to the US to mollify an anxious Beijing.
This time around the approach has been completely different. Through the Bush-Hu conversation, the US indirectly endorsed the KMT’s position of “one China with each side having its own interpretation,” using the so-called “1992 consensus” to combine Beijing’s “one China” principle, the US’ “one China” policy and the KMT’s interpretation into an amorphous “one China consensus.”
The one area in which they all overlap is the belief that Taiwan is a part of China.
The KMT and the Chinese Communist Party have different ideas about what China is. The US recognizes the commonalities and differences in their positions and wants to arrive at the eventual solution through peaceful means. The disagreement is not over one China, but rather the mutual denial of the other side’s interpretation.
In light of all this, the DPP’s defeat was not just the electoral setback of a politician or a party. It also signifies that Taiwanese independence will not be an item on a future cross-strait agenda. The US, China and the KMT have schemed together to exclude any discussion of Taiwan’s de jure independence from this cross-strait one China structure.
Even though the DPP has asked to be included in future cross-strait negotiations and Chen again questioned the existence of a “1992 consensus” in his meeting with Burghardt, these were feeble attempts at protest. There is no way to stop the formation of a long-term stable “one China” structure within the US-China-Taiwan dynamic. A new power structure has already pushed out the DPP and independence advocates.
A democratic Taiwan that does not pursue de jure independence is probably the most in line with US interests.
Democracy can be used to enclose China. It also keeps Taiwan from being swallowed by China. Moreover, a Taiwan that does not pursue de jure independence will not interfere in Sino-American relations. There would no longer be any need to handle situations arising from Taiwan’s independence-pursuing tendencies.
This kind of Taiwan would no longer be a troublemaker in Washington’s eyes. Moreover, it would be an important pillar of a stable and peaceful framework concocted by the US and Beijing.
Not surprisingly, former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), an old hand in these matters, was able to see how the intimate interactions between Ma and the US would bring Taiwan back to the era of late president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) and relegate it to the role of a dependant regime.
Hsu Yung-ming is an assistant professor of political science at Soochow University.
TRANSLATED BY JAMES CHEN
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