Humans love to suppress abstract dangers. They react only after they get their fingers burned. In handling nuclear risks, however, we can hardly get away with such childlike behavior.
To begin with, the old system of nuclear deterrence, which has survived particularly in the US and Russia since the Cold War's end, still involves lots of risks and dangers. While the international public largely ignores this fact, the risks remain.
To be sure, in the 1990's the US and Russia reduced their nuclear arsenals from 65,000 to approximately 26,000 weapons. But this number is still almost unimaginable and beyond any rational level needed for deterrence. Moreover, there are another 1,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of other nuclear states.
A second cause for worry is that the world is poised to enter a new nuclear age that threatens to be even more dangerous and expensive than the Cold War era of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Indeed, the outlines of this new nuclear age are already visible:
* The connection between terrorism and nuclear weapons;
* a nuclear-armed North Korea;
* the risk of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East triggered by Iran's nuclear program;
* a new definition of state sovereignty as "nuclear sovereignty," accompanied by a massive increase in the number of small and medium-sized nuclear states;
* a possible collapse of public order in nuclear Pakistan;
* the illegal proliferation of military nuclear technology;
* the legal proliferation of civilian nuclear technology and an increase in the number of "civilian" nuclear states, implying military proliferation risks;
* the nuclearization of space, triggering an arms race among large nuclear powers.
Important political leaders, especially in the two biggest nuclear powers, the US and Russia, know today's existing risks and tomorrow's emerging ones all too well. Yet nothing is being done to control, contain, or eliminate them. On the contrary, the situation is worsening.
Vital pillars of the old arms-control and anti-proliferation regime have either been destroyed -- as was the case with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- or substantially weakened, as with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Responsibility for this lays largely with the administration of US President George W. Bush which, by terminating the ABM Treaty, not only weakened the international control systems for nuclear weapons, but also sat on its hands when confronted with the NPT's imminent collapse.
At the beginning of the 21st century, proliferation of military nuclear technology is one of the major threats to humanity, particularly if this technology falls into terrorists' hands.
The use of nuclear weapons by terrorists would not only result in a major humanitarian tragedy, but also would most likely move the world beyond the threshold for actually waging a nuclear war. The consequences would be a nightmare.
Nearly equally worrisome is the nuclear redefinition of state sovereignty because it will not only lead to a large number of small, politically unstable nuclear powers, but will also increase the risk of proliferation into the hands of terrorists. Pakistan would, most likely, no longer be an isolated case.
An international initiative for the renewal and improvement of the international control regime, led by both big nuclear powers, is urgently needed to meet these and all other risks of the new nuclear age. For, if disarmament is to become effective, the signal must come from the top -- the US and Russia. Here, the willingness of nuclear powers to implement their commitment to disarmament, as agreed in the NPT, is of prime importance.
The NPT -- a bedrock of peace for more than three decades -- is based on a political agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear states: the latter abstain from obtaining nuclear weapons, while the former destroy their arsenals. Unfortunately, only the first part of this agreement was realized (though not completely), while the second part still awaits fulfillment.
The NPT remains indispensable and needs urgent revision. However, this central pillar of international proliferation control is on the brink of collapse. The most recent Review Conference in New York, in May 2005, ended virtually without any result.
The essential defect of the NPT is now visible in the nuclear dispute between Iran and the UN Security Council: The treaty permits the development of all nuclear components indispensable for military use -- particularly uranium enrichment -- so long as there is no outright nuclear weapons program.
This means that in emerging nuclear countries only one single political decision is required to "weaponize" a nuclear program. This kind of "security" is not sufficient.
Another controversial issue also has also come to the fore in connection with the current nuclear conflict with Iran: discrimination-free access to nuclear technology.
Solving this problem will require the internationalization of access to civilian nuclear technology, along with filling the security gap under the existing NPT and substantially more far-reaching monitoring of all states that want to be part of such a system.
Leaders around the world know the dangers of a new nuclear age; they also know how to minimize them. But the political will to act decisively is not there, because the public does not regard nuclear disarmament and arms control as a political priority.
This must change. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are not questions of the past. They need to be addressed today if they are not to become the most dangerous threats tomorrow.
Joschka Fischer was German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005 and led Germany's Green Party for nearly 20 years.
Copyright: Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences
There is much evidence that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is sending soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and is learning lessons for a future war against Taiwan. Until now, the CCP has claimed that they have not sent PLA personnel to support Russian aggression. On 18 April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelinskiy announced that the CCP is supplying war supplies such as gunpowder, artillery, and weapons subcomponents to Russia. When Zelinskiy announced on 9 April that the Ukrainian Army had captured two Chinese nationals fighting with Russians on the front line with details
On a quiet lane in Taipei’s central Daan District (大安), an otherwise unremarkable high-rise is marked by a police guard and a tawdry A4 printout from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicating an “embassy area.” Keen observers would see the emblem of the Holy See, one of Taiwan’s 12 so-called “diplomatic allies.” Unlike Taipei’s other embassies and quasi-consulates, no national flag flies there, nor is there a plaque indicating what country’s embassy this is. Visitors hoping to sign a condolence book for the late Pope Francis would instead have to visit the Italian Trade Office, adjacent to Taipei 101. The death of
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), joined by the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), held a protest on Saturday on Ketagalan Boulevard in Taipei. They were essentially standing for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is anxious about the mass recall campaign against KMT legislators. President William Lai (賴清德) said that if the opposition parties truly wanted to fight dictatorship, they should do so in Tiananmen Square — and at the very least, refrain from groveling to Chinese officials during their visits to China, alluding to meetings between KMT members and Chinese authorities. Now that China has been defined as a foreign hostile force,
On April 19, former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) gave a public speech, his first in about 17 years. During the address at the Ketagalan Institute in Taipei, Chen’s words were vague and his tone was sour. He said that democracy should not be used as an echo chamber for a single politician, that people must be tolerant of other views, that the president should not act as a dictator and that the judiciary should not get involved in politics. He then went on to say that others with different opinions should not be criticized as “XX fellow travelers,” in reference to
RSS