Taiwan has a very distinct international environment. When it comes to defensive weapons, whether purchased or manufactured, Taiwan faces numerous particular difficulties and limitations. Faced with these constraints, both the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have attempted to procure armaments through various indirect methods. The creation of the army firm Taiwan Goal was therefore nothing new.
Yet, under similar international pressure and circumstances, Singapore's reputedly incorruptible government has smoothly managed to push through similar armament procurement policies.
The intricacies of arms procurement are comparable to the many layers of a cabbage, or even an onion that may eventually bring you to tears as you peel off the layers.
The difference between the Taiwan Goal furor and previous armament purchases lies in the fact that the former not only aimed at improving bureaucratic efficiency through privatization, but also attempted to encompass the entire logistic support of national defense.
Furthermore, Taiwan Goal attempted to return to the arms procurement approach employed during the era of former president Lee Teng-hui (
It is not difficult to understand why the DPP wanted to continue this strategy. However, given the current national strategy and international climate, one cannot help but ask: Could Taiwan afford this type of direct disturbance of its relationship with Beijing and Washington?
Herein lies the kernel of the onion -- arms procurement.
The first layer of problems is that after aggressive economic reforms, an emerging China and its modernized military is putting increasing pressure on Taiwan and East Asia. While China continues to gain strength, Taiwan has become weaker. In only a few years, Taiwan's national defense capabilities have sunk to the point where even its abilities for self-defense may be in doubt -- let alone the possibility of offensive action or a counterstrike.
From the original "Four Noes and One Without" policy at the beginning of the DPP's terms in office -- where the military was maintained on a self-defense mode -- to the current battle for international recognition and the issue of the UN bid, military procurement must make a similar move toward counterstrike weapons systems. The Taiwan Goal incident fully reflects the changing political strategies of the DPP government.
The second layer of problems is that regulations require the military to obtain its arms through the Ministry of National Defense's Armaments Bureau, the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, the Combined Logistics Command and other governmental bodies, under the supervision of the vice-director-general of the Armaments Bureau.
Given Taiwan's international situation, obtaining the necessary weapons is indeed troublesome. If purchases can be made through a private entity, then the predicament would be resolved and there would also be the benefits of higher efficiency.
Yet, on further consideration, arms procurement involves vast profits and the appropriateness of privatizing a purchasing process that used to come under the scrutiny of the legislature has failed to convince the public.
Even if the DPP and the KMT were to cooperate, could the public really trust them? Besides, how would we determine the status and the division of labor between the existing system for defense within the government and Taiwan Goal?
Once Taiwan Goal was established, it could have usurped the role of the government sector and moved beyond its control. Either that, or the government and private sector would then become mutually obstructive and achieve half the results with twice the effort.
Returning to the third layer of the issue: Why did the DPP wait until its eighth year in power to implement such a strategy?
Why not focus on selected priorities in a trial run, and then expand and enlarge its operations, rather than incorporate the entire logistical operations of national defense at once?
Why not select a publicly trusted and professional individual to act as chairman?
The implementation of Taiwan Goal was abysmal in every respect, from timing and operational scope, to staffing choices.
The fourth layer of the problem is Taiwan Goal's entire disregard for the law, regulations and system. Even if the ruling party controls both legislative and executive power, it would be hard-pressed to satisfy the public. Furthermore, to respond to public inquiry by saying the company would be abandoned if the party fails to win the presidential election is infantile.
The most severe problem is that the Taiwan Goal incident has not only damaged Taiwan-US relations once again, but also blocked the chance to develop European armament sources. The DPP's intervention into armament issues has been called into question over timing, staffing choices and motivation -- not to mention the crude and uncivilized implementation method. Before even getting off the ground, Taiwan Goal has already damaged Taiwan. The consequences will be borne by Taiwanese.
After serving the military and the country for more than four decades, it is tormenting to see the government's total disregard of military professionalism, national security, the well-being of the country and its people, and the dignity of our men and women in uniform.
As we peel off the layers of the arms procurement intricacies, it seems we can do little but to dab away the tears in our eyes.
Tang Fei is a former premier and current president of the Taiwan Vision Forum and Association.
Translated by Angela Hong
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