BY NOW, EVERYONE has heard about the Chinese government's refusal to allow the USS Kitty Hawk battle group and its crew of 8,000 to make a port call in Hong Kong for Thanksgiving -- as well as China's supposed reversal of the decision on "humanitarian" grounds after the flotilla had already steamed out to sea. We now know the Chinese reversed their decision when they tracked the USS Kitty Hawk's battle group sailing back to Japan through the Taiwan Strait. So much for China's "humanitarian" concerns.
Beijing's foreign minister initially told US President George W. Bush the incident was a "misunderstanding," but his own ministry insisted the following day that there was no such "misunderstanding."
Instead, the Chinese said the decision was in retaliation for the Bush administration's decision to approve a US$1 billion upgrade to Taiwan's missile defense system and Congress' presenting the Dalai Lama with the Congressional Gold Medal.
This provocative move by Beijing should come as a surprise to no one. After all, the US relationship with China has long been one of "give and take" -- the US gives, and China takes. Each time the US makes an accommodation, Beijing sees only weakness and becomes more aggressive -- which in turn prompts the US State Department to offer yet more concessions.
Since late 2003, the Bush administration has bent over backwards to appease China; President Bush publicly denounced President Chen Shui-bian (
State Department officials have also refused to allow Chen to transit through continental US en route to Latin America. In August, Bush dispatched US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte to parrot the language of China's "Anti-Secession" Law and criticize an upcoming referendum in Taiwan -- on a Chinese television station.
And most recently, the Bush administration inexplicably refused to act on Taiwan's request for F-16s -- despite the fact that the White House has spent the last five years criticizing the Taiwanese government for failing to make sufficient investment in defense.
And for all of this pandering, what has the Bush administration gained?
Half-hearted Chinese cooperation in the "Six Party Talks," Chinese obstruction in the human tragedy unfolding in Sudan, renewed Chinese threats of military action against Taiwan, and now the brazen and public humiliation of the US in barring the USS Kitty Hawk from Hong Kong's harbor.
And China, certainly no help in encouraging transparency in Tehran's nuclear ambitions, is now using the latest National Intelligence Estimate on Iran as a rationale for pressuring the US, the Europeans and the International Atomic Energy Agency to ease off on demands for access to what is still a very troubling ongoing uranium enrichment program.
Since 1979, when the US recognized China, the US has repeatedly attempted to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in an effort to establish some kind of quid pro quo with the Chinese.
Aside from the moral shortcomings inherent in this duplicitous policy -- the approach simply hasn't worked -- numerous US "quids" over the years have never produced any meaningful Chinese "quo."
Late last month, for example, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman responded to a question about whether Beijing would support additional UN measures to curb Iranian nuclear enrichment efforts if the US scaled back arms sales to Taiwan. The spokesman responded by saying that China would "never trade its sovereignty or principle" on the matter.
The US relationship with Taiwan isn't the only thing that has suffered as a result of our hopeless policy of appeasement vis-a-vis China.
It highlights a glaring hypocrisy in US foreign policy, undermines our international image, emboldens our enemies and enhances the credibility of our detractors like China.
The Bush administration's practice of trying to limit Taiwan's democratic development and diplomatic space in return for China's illusory "cooperation" on North Korea, Myanmar, Iran or Sudan sends the message that the US is ceding Asia to China's hegemony.
A poll conducted earlier this month found that a plurality of Europeans now believe that China will replace the US as the dominant world power by 2020. Unless the US becomes more forceful in standing up for its principles and asserting its interests, this alarming perception could very likely become a reality.
If the US wants to reverse this dangerous trend it must start by changing its antiquated China policy.
The "one China" road the US started down in the 1970s has failed to resolve the "Taiwan Problem" or yield any tangible benefits for the US.
It is time the US rejected this anachronistic and ineffective policy in favor of a more honest and defensible "two-state solution" that extends full diplomatic recognition to both Taiwan and China.
Such a move would have a number of advantages -- beyond just providing US sailors with a friendly Taiwanese port in which to spend Thanksgiving with their families next year.
Establishing normal diplomatic ties with democratic Taiwan would also remedy a nagging inconsistency in US foreign policy. And -- as dual recognition did with East and West Germany -- might also open the door for an even-handed dialogue between the two sides, providing a real opportunity for Beijing and Taipei to resolve their differences peacefully -- whatever that resolution might be.
Tom Tancredo represents Colorado's 6th Congressional District in the US House of Representatives and is a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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