Recent decisions by the Chinese to deny harbor to the USS Kitty Hawk on Thanksgiving Day and the USS James Reuben for a New Year's Day visit not only blocked hundreds of families from reuniting with their loved ones but further reinforced for Americans that global politics are playing out in places other than the battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan and at the negotiating tables in Annapolis. Why the apparent sudden sea-change in Chinese behavior?
China's lack of hospitality is in stark contrast to recent trends in military-to-military relations that can be characterized as more cooperative than contentious. Witness US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' successful meetings with Chinese defense officials last month. However, China's contentious decisions over port calls have been widely interpreted as a not so subtle signal to Washington policymakers that the choice to honor the Dalai Lama and provide a US$900 million upgrade to Taiwan's Patriot anti-missile system was at the root of the discord.
And yet, there may be larger forces at work, signaling a shift or at least a debate among the Chinese elite over how best to deal with the US.
It has been understood that an abiding belief in China's foreign policy is to do nothing to unduly antagonize the US -- particularly as the US has been strategically preoccupied in the Middle East. Chinese leaders appreciate that Washington will not easily cede its power or influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and so they have been careful not to make "Asia Pacific waves" during a period when the US is involved in quixotic military quests in Afghanistan and Iraq.
From the perspective of China's leaders, these are welcome detours that should be encouraged and the best way to do this is by avoiding unnecessary problems in Asia-Pacific. China's proactive role in the North Korean nuclear negotiations is emblematic of this attitude.
However, recent examples suggest that hardliners, particularly in the military, are growing more impatient with Beijing's generally cautious and outwardly accommodating foreign policy. No longer are they willing to avoid public friction and even confrontation with the US at all costs. Observe China's successful anti-satellite test last January.
This is highlighted by Beijing's Olympic quality diplomatic jujitsu in the UN to stall authorization for more robust action against Iran. This is compounded by the occasional hint that China is preparing to flex its growing financial muscle in ways inimical to Western interests by unloading its mountain of US Treasury bills. All the while, China's continuous hacking of Pentagon computers further suggests at least a furtive antagonism is on the rise.
Individually, these events are perhaps inconsequential, but in sum, they indicate a subtle shift towards a more assertive policy stance in China.
The wisest elders in China recognize that Beijing has to consolidate its domestic and foreign policy position in order to become a more powerful, and hopefully for the US, a more "responsible stakeholder" in the international community. These moderate reformers counsel patience and suggest that China is best served by biding its time and building its strength before taking exception to what most in the Chinese elite see as the indignities imposed by US actions when it comes to the three "T's" -- Tibet, Taiwan and trade.



