After 11 years in power, four-term Australian Prime Minister John Howard of the Liberal Party and his center-right coalition were defeated in the election on Nov. 24.
As expected, Labor Party leader Kevin Rudd, a China expert and shadow minister for foreign affairs, and his deputy Julia Gillard will become the new prime minister and deputy prime minister.
The change will have an impact on Taiwan, China and the US.
US President George W. Bush's administration predicted the outcome.
To reverse the impression that Howard has a better relationship with Washington, Bush made a point of meeting Rudd during the APEC summit in Sydney this year.
THREE PILLARS
Despite Rudd's insistence on withdrawing Australian troops from Iraq if he came to power, he maintains that the three pillars of Australia's foreign affairs policy are its relations with the UN, Asia and the US.
Hence, Australian-US strategic cooperation may not undergo any drastic changes, although Australian troops will be gradually withdrawn from Iraq.
Another possible source of difference lies in the opposite stances on the issue of climate change between the new Australian government and the Bush administration, as Rudd is likely to sign the Kyoto Protocol on global warming as soon as possible.
CLOSER TO BEIJING
When it comes to Beijing, Rudd understands Chinese affairs and is seen as much closer to Beijing than Howard was.
In light of China's strategic position after its "peaceful rise," however, Rudd's Cabinet and the US are still standing on the same side, as their strategic cooperation remains unchanged.
As Rudd says, China has brought Australia a lot of hope economically but also a lot of challenges politically, especially in the areas of democratization and protection of human rights.
Thus, Australia and the US will continue to communicate with China to resolve their differences. Rudd is likely to play a key role in the bilateral relationship between China and the US.
REWARDS
Rudd studied Mandarin at National Taiwan Normal University in his younger years. His election as the 26th Australian prime minister is thus a demonstration of the diplomatic rewards of Chinese-language education in Taiwan.
Unfortunately, in recent years, Chinese-language education for foreigners has lagged behind China. Now is therefore a great time for us to review our policy to boost diplomatic diversity.
Australia treats the South Pacific as its sphere of influence, but its policy in the region is often damaged by Taiwanese and Chinese dollar diplomacy.
Thus, Taiwan must also review its South Pacific and Australia policies to be able to seize the chance to improve Taiwan-Australia relations in the Rudd era.
The Taiwanese government must realize that although Rudd studied Mandarin in Taiwan, he is just like his predecessors in that he does not want to commit himself on the sensitive question of whether Australia would send troops to help Taiwan if a cross-strait war breaks out.
And if Australia and China continue to develop their economic and diplomatic relations, the possibility that Canberra will send troops to help Taiwan will be slim.
Huang Kwei-bo is an associate professor in the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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