For a long time, the ASEAN was perceived as an inward-looking entity, sometimes labeled a mere "debating club" with little impact on larger-scale regional politics. Today, ASEAN not only demonstrates the willingness and ability to reform its organizational structure, but at the same time it follows a skillful hedging strategy by engaging major powers in East Asia and beyond through various cooperative frameworks.
Former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan, who will serve as ASEAN's next secretary- general, characterized the association in a recent interview as "a fulcrum of power plays in the region," referring specifically to "economic power plays, political and security power plays."
The upcoming adoption of the historic ASEAN Charter is expected to increase the effectiveness of the organization (by strengthening institutions and streamlining decision making) while ensuring greater accountability of its members (by measures such as the establishment of a regional human rights body).
Besides transforming ASEAN into a more cohesive group, the Charter also aims to achieve more effective implementation of international agreements, thus enhancing the numerous multilateral processes ASEAN is engaged in. Among these processes, the intensification of ASEAN-China ties has attracted particular attention.
China's attitude towards multilateral frameworks had long been cautious. Beijing felt that such structures could facilitate -- to its disadvantage -- the internationalization of issues vital to China's national interest, such as the Taiwan question or the Spratly Islands dispute.
Attitudes changed two decades ago, when Beijing began to seek regional arrangements aimed at calming the concerns of Southeast Asian governments over China's rise while at the same time constraining US influence and more actively isolating Taiwan.
This year's speeches on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of ASEAN indicated the mutual will to reach a new quality of ASEAN-China relations.
China is ASEAN's most important trading partner (bilateral trade is expected to reach US$200 billion nest year). The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, to be established in 2010 with the six founding members of ASEAN, will include 1.8 billion consumers, representing the world's largest market of its kind.
More importantly, Beijing is willing to deepen its security ties with the association. Last week China signed a defense cooperation agreement with Indonesia, referred to by Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan (曹剛川) as the first "strategic partnership" of an ASEAN member with China. The People's Liberation Army is already providing training for ASEAN officers and earlier this year China suggested joint military exercises with ASEAN.
Notwithstanding the actual scope of such exchanges the proposals sent a clear signal to the US and its allies Japan, South Korea and Australia. The Chinese overtures directly affect US security interests in Southeast Asia, as Washington has defense treaties with ASEAN members Thailand and the Philippines and a security partnership with ASEAN member Singapore.
For the time being, China is only gradually expanding its military relationships in Southeast Asia. The key foreign policy objectives of the Chinese Communist Party remain securing internal stability, sustaining economic growth, deterring territorial threats (including perceived threats to China's sovereignty) and being accepted as an increasingly influential regional power.
Beijing is eager to emphasize that its rise is peaceful and has successfully engaged in "smile diplomacy" around the globe. Nevertheless, China's true strategic intentions remain ambiguous and the enormous pace and scope of its military buildup point towards an impending Chinese dominance in the Asia-Pacific of the future. It remains to be seen whether the US -- the leading military power, biggest economic force and largest aid donor in the region -- possesses the political will to counter such a development. For ASEAN, the challenge will be to carefully balance its multilayered partnerships with China against the background of possibly alienating the US and its democratic Asian allies.
In fact, when ASEAN was established in 1967 one underlying goal was to establish a counterweight to external powers (such as China) and to promote political self-reliance for its members. Today, while most Southeast Asian governments may still be wary of China's ambitions, some appear tempted to succumb to Beijing's soft power charm offensive and expand cooperation into the military sphere.
However, any strategic alignment of ASEAN with China risks accelerating what Chinese officials have frequently voiced concerns about: The formation of an "East Asian NATO," necessitated by the common security interests of the US, Australia, Japan, South Korea and possibly India, in light of a potentially hegemonic China.
Concerning transparency of defense-related issues, the ASEAN Regional Forum -- with its broad participation of 26 countries (including the US) plus the EU -- has so far served as a feasible platform for dialogue.
It is noteworthy that a competing forum emerged in 2005, the East Asian Summit (EAS), where the US is not included. In contrast to other ASEAN frameworks the EAS declaration explicitly mentions "strategic dialogue" and "promoting cooperation in security issues."
China will continue to amplify its influence along the expanding ASEAN summitry, forge closer security ties with ASEAN and increasingly attempt to downsize US leverage in the region. ASEAN members on the other hand, while considering their hedging options, may find themselves unwillingly sliding into political dependency on China.
The new ASEAN Charter could provide some guidance for the association's future strategic orientation, especially if human rights and democratic values were to be included in the document as the fundamental principles of ASEAN. Regional economic integration, including improved access to China's vast market, is crucial for ASEAN's prosperity. How-ever, regional stability will be put into jeopardy if the association's "security power plays" eventually translate into ASEAN's band-wagoning with China.
Jan Schlotthus is a German writer based in Taipei
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