Although I recognize Jules Quartly's skepticism about the Falun Gong ("Falun Gong finds its own way," March 25, page 17), I can't say I appreciate his sense of cynicism when describing the nine-day workshop.
It's clear to me that his goal, as a starting point, was to write an entertaining piece for the paper rather than to seek personal enlightenment.
Besides the fact that he doesn't appear to have one predestined bone in his body, it's no wonder that the teachings did not seem to appeal to him.
I can't help but notice that Quartly's interpretation of the teachings seems to be stretched a bit far, almost to the point of sensationalism with a nuance of propaganda.
Nevertheless, there are countless reports of people who have experienced physical improvements and spiritual fulfillment through Falun Gong's simple, yet powerful qigong practice -- and they don't feel the need to move on to other practices. I am one of them.
However, finding fulfillment is not a given -- only if you can thoroughly understand the Great Law, Dafa, will you reap the benefits.
Marie Beaulieu
Victoria, British Columbia
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