I find it unfortunate that the 30th anniversary of Mao Zedong's (
Don't get me wrong. I'm not one of those nostalgic Mao worshipers. Au contraire: With China emerging as the new economic powerhouse of Asia, I think it is crucial for the free world to remember China's history and learn not to take things at face value.
Mao's anniversary did just that, by keeping us in touch with the true nature of the beast in the midst of this chaotic race toward world domination. It is clear that selective amnesia, being the prime syndrome of just about anyone doing business with China these days, has not only hit the majority but has become second nature for most.
Too many people deliberately fail to recognize that the Cultural Revolution never really died -- it was merely extended as what we know today to be the persecution of Falun Gong, whose members are being butchered for their organs all across China.
But all is not lost -- kudos to the Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party (published by the Epoch Times, a Falun Gong newspaper) for exposing the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) shocking history, which has spread far and wide in China today.
So far 13 million Chinese people reacting to this truth have quit the party. While the dictators are making some headway with cleaning up the undesirables before the 2008 Olympics, one can only wonder how many more Mao worshipers will follow suit.
With the red wall slowly crumbling down, the dictators can no longer divorce themselves from their own miserable, gory history of bloodlust and merciless killings -- they are feeling threatened and haunted by their own shadows.
I'm sure this is enough to have Mao turn in his grave while others are digging their own graves.
Marie Beaulieu
Victoria, Canada
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