Polls in the US show low public approval for President George W. Bush's handling of foreign policy, but little agreement on what should take its place. The unbridled ambitions of the neo-conservatives and assertive nationalists in his first administration produced a foreign policy that was like a car with an accelerator, but no brakes. It was bound to go off the road.
But how should the US use its unprecedented power, and what role should values play? Realists warn against letting values determine policy, but democracy and human rights have been an inherent part of US foreign policy for two centuries. The Democratic Party could solve this problem by adopting the suggestion of Robert Wright and others that it pursue "progressive realism." What would go into a progressive realist foreign policy?
A progressive realist foreign policy would start with an understanding of the strength and limits of US power. The US is the only superpower, but preponderance is not empire or hegemony. The US can influence but not control other parts of the world.
Power always depends upon context, and the context of world politics today is like a three-dimensional chess game. The top board of military power is unipolar; but on the middle board of economic relations, the world is multipolar.
On the bottom board of transnational relations -- comprising issues such as like climate change, illegal drugs, avian flu and terrorism -- power is chaotically distributed.
Military power is a small part of the solution in responding to these new threats on the bottom board of international relations. They require cooperation among governments and international institutions.
Even on the top board -- where the US represents nearly half of world defense expenditures -- the military is supreme in the global commons of air, sea and space, but more limited in its ability to control nationalistic populations in occupied areas.
A progressive realist policy would also stress the importance of developing an integrated grand strategy that combines "hard" military power with "soft" attractive power into "smart" power of the sort that won the Cold War.
The US needs to use hard power against terrorists, but it cannot hope to win the struggle against terrorism unless it gains the hearts and minds of moderates. The misuse of hard power -- as at Abu Ghraib or Haditha -- produces new terrorist recruits.
Today, the US has no such integrated strategy for combining hard and soft power. Many official instruments of soft power -- public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military to military contacts -- are scattered around the government, and there is no overarching policy, much less a common budget, that even tries to combine them with hard power into a coherent national security strategy.
The US spends roughly 500 times more on its military than it does on broadcasting and exchanges. Is this the right proportion? And how should the government relate to the non-official generators of soft power -- everything from Hollywood to Harvard to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation -- that emanate from civil society?
A progressive realist policy must advance the promise of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" enshrined in US tradition. Such a grand strategy would have four key pillars: providing security for the US and its allies; maintaining a strong domestic and international economy; avoiding environmental disasters, such as pandemics and global flooding; and encouraging liberal democracy and human rights at home and, where feasible, abroad.
This does not mean imposing US values by force. Democracy promotion is better accomplished by attraction than coercion, and it takes time and patience.
The US would be wise to encourage the gradual evolution of democracy, but in a manner that accepts the reality of cultural diversity.
Such a grand strategy would focus on four major threats. Probably the greatest danger is the intersection of terrorism with nuclear materials. Preventing this requires policies to fight terrorism and promote, non-proliferation, better protection of nuclear materials, stability in the Middle East, as well as greater attention to failed states.
The second major challenge is the rise of a hostile hegemon as Asia gradually regains the three-fifths share of the world economy that corresponds to its three-fifths share of the world's population.
This requires a policy that integrates China as a responsible global stakeholder, but hedges against possible hostility by maintaining close relations with Japan, India and other countries in the region.
The third major threat is an economic depression, that could be possibly triggered by financial mismanagement, or by a crisis that disrupts global access to oil flows from the Persian Gulf -- home to two-thirds of world oil reserves.
This will require policies that gradually reduce dependence on oil, while realizing that it will not be possible to isolate the US economy from global energy markets.
The fourth major threat is ecological breakdown, such as pandemics and negative climate change. This will require prudent energy policies as well as greater cooperation through international institutions such as the WHO.
A progressive realist policy should look to the long-term evolution of world order and realize the responsibility of the international system's most powerful country to produce global public or common goods.
In the 19th century, Britain defined its national interest broadly to include promoting freedom of the seas, an open international economy and a stable European balance of power. Such common goods benefited both Britain and other countries as well. They also contributed to Britain's legitimacy and soft power.
With the US now in Britain's place, it should play a similar role by promoting an open international economy and commons (seas, space, Internet), mediating international disputes before they escalate, and developing international rules and institutions.
Because globalization will spread technical capabilities, and information technology will allow broader participation in global communications, US preponderance will become less dominant later this century.
Progressive realism requires the US to prepare for that future by defining its national interest in a way that benefits all.
Joseph Nye, a former US assistant secretary of defense and director of the National Security Agency, is a professor at Harvard University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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