Last week the US National Security Council released a 49-page document entitled The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, outlining US President George W. Bush's strategy for defense and foreign policy for the remainder of his second term. At the same time, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also expressed Washington's growing concerns about China's military build-up.
Washington's statements regarding its dissatisfaction with Beijing's military expansion were conceivably a response to recent comments made by Guo Boxiong (
Stressing Beijing's objections to the efforts of "Taiwanese independence secessionist forces," Guo announced that China's military budget would increase by 14.7 percent this year to 283.8 billion yuan (US$35.3 billion).
The budget increase could be interpreted as a strong reaction to President Chen Shui-bian's (
Washington's grave concerns are caused not only by the military budget increases themselves, but also by the lack of transparency behind them.
Washington faces something of a dilemma: While the Taiwanese government continues to pursue democratization, the US is often hamstrung by its own policy of calling on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to maintain the "status quo."
Bush has repeated his call for a peaceful resolution to cross-strait tensions, warning China that it should not use coercive measures against Taiwan, and cautioning both sides against unilateral actions that change the "status quo."
Nevertheless, when it comes to the question of which side is actively seeking to change the "status quo," we need look only at the military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait for the answer.
Could it be more clear who is rocking the boat and altering the "status quo" through military means? Should the Taiwanese people be considered troublemakers for embracing democracy?
Since the US report called on China to "follow the path of East Asia's many modern democracies, including Taiwan," the current US policy of "encouraging both sides of the Taiwan Strait to engage in dialogue and solve mutual disputes in a peaceful manner" should further incorporate the idea of promoting democratic principles. This would fit with Bush's grand strategy of spreading democracy throughout the world and maintaining regional and international security.
Politicians of all parties in Taiwan should read the US report carefully -- its findings are a timely wake-up call for those who have painted a fanciful picture of unification between Taiwan and China.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (
Most importantly, China must recognize the fact that any attempts to intimidate or belittle Taiwan will only have a negative effect.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when