By drawing attention to a supposed al-Qaeda infiltration of the Occupied Territories, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas may have done Hamas a favor. Despite visceral US and Israeli hostility towards the militant Palestinian movement that won parliamentary elections in the West Bank and Gaza on Jan.25, Abbas implied that there were far worse alternatives. Al-Qaeda is undoubtedly one of them.
Abbas has no reason to love Hamas. The defeat of his Fatah party has left him much weakened. Israel has called him "irrelevant."
US efforts are now focused on how best to ostracize a Hamas government when it takes office, unless it first renounces armed struggle and recognizes Israel. Abbas has been largely reduced to the role of spectator.
Israel predictably used his comments to propagate its belief that Hamas is party to an international terrorist conspiracy, despite Hamas denials of any knowledge of the supposed al-Qaeda infiltration.
But the Palestinian president is not alone in trying to place Hamas' rise to power in perspective.
Russia irritated Washington with talks in Moscow with a delegation from Hamas, which it refuses to categorize as a terrorist organization. It says the movement's success is a reality that must be dealt with -- although Russia, too, wants Hamas to change its ways.
Turkey has also defied Israel and the US by hosting a visit from the Palestinians' new rulers; and some EU countries are wavering over proposed anti-Hamas sanctions.
The argument in Ankara and other European capitals is that you cannot promote democracy in the Middle East and then reject its legitimate consequences.
Abbas and others say if the Hamas leadership is given time to adjust, it may soften its stance, for example by implementing an indefinite truce. If the US insists on ending international funding for the Palestinian Authority, as Israel is demanding, they say Washington will only strengthen Palestinian hardliners and rejectionists such as Islamic Jihad, engender ever greater suffering for ordinary Palestinians and risk the final wreck of the peace process.
But as matters stand now, that is exactly where US policy is heading.
It might be thought that its Iraq experience had taught the Bush administration the need to show flexibility in Middle East politics rather than simply laying down the law. Yet in Iraq as in the Palestinian Territories, the White House -- although not a more savvy State Department -- continues to look at issues in black and white.
In its monochrome landscape, the only barrier between Iraqis and a peaceful, democratic future is a minority of armed Sunni insurgents and criminals, backed by foreign jihadis.
Iraq's reality is much more complicated, involving for instance lethal rivalries between Shiite militias, inter-regional tensions encouraged by the new US-approved Constitution, corrupt or incompetent political, military and police authorities, a still moribund economy, the virtual secession of Kurdistan and widespread nationalist sentiment opposed to ongoing foreign occupation.
But US President George W. Bush's White House, fixated by the fear of all-out civil war in Iraq, facing a collapse of confidence in US policy at home and beset by record-low presidential approval ratings of 34 percent, appears less and less able or inclined to pick its way through the Iraqi maze.
In the space of three chaotic years, Bush has gone from talk of a great victory to ill-disguised yearning for a quick, "honorable" exit. In between these two extremes may lie a more pragmatic and effective policy, based on the art of the possible. But like his attitude to Hamas, the president appears to see no middle way.
This all-or-nothing approach has met with similar reverses elsewhere in the Middle East. Washington's drive last autumn to unseat Syrian President Bashar Assad following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister, has ground to a halt.
This is partly because US allies in the region, notably Israel, warned of Iraq-style chaos should the Syrian regime collapse. But instead of modifying its stance on Syria in the light of such calculations, and thereby advancing at least some of its objectives, the US appears to have almost lost interest. It remains viscerally hostile to Assad. But seen from Damascus, it has been left looking like a paper tiger.
It is easy to point to mistakes with the benefit of hindsight. But so predictable and repetitive are the Bush administration's policy patterns that it is possible, in its case, to identify future accidents waiting to happen. The most troublesome is Iran.
As before the Iraq invasion, Washington is building up a dossier of grievances against Tehran. They range from its nuclear activities and its links with Hamas and Hezbollah to its "interference" in Iraq and its human rights record. And it has succeeded in persuading the US public, according to a recent poll, that Iran's leadership is public enemy No. 1 and therefore a direct threat to the US.
It appears not to have occurred to Bush that talking directly to Iran on some of the above issues, rather than isolating, antagonizing and confronting it with threats of sanctions or force, might actually serve US interests on a wide range of fronts. With the possible exception of ambassador-level talks with Iran on Iraqi security, such a course of action is not contemplated -- in part because it might entail compromise. Here once again is the familiar all-or-nothing approach.
Despite the "realism" in some parts of the foreign policy establishment, Bush is still making pictures in black-and-white. And Iran, the Movie could soon be coming to a cinema near you.
On Sept. 3 in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rolled out a parade of new weapons in PLA service that threaten Taiwan — some of that Taiwan is addressing with added and new military investments and some of which it cannot, having to rely on the initiative of allies like the United States. The CCP’s goal of replacing US leadership on the global stage was advanced by the military parade, but also by China hosting in Tianjin an August 31-Sept. 1 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which since 2001 has specialized
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