The US employs a policy of maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait and opposing any unilateral change in the relationship between Taiwan and China. This policy is lopsided.
In the last few years, the number of China's ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan has doubled to 784. Last year, China put its "Anti-Secession" Law into effect, authorizing its military leaders to attack Taiwan at any time without even first getting permission from Chinese President Hu Jintao (
Today, Taiwan is more militarily threatened, epidemically unprotected and diplomatically isolated by China than ever before. The so-called "Red Storm" is blowing hard over Taiwan, Japan and other countries. The power balance is unequal.
US officials should express surprise at the failure of Taiwan's legislature to pass the arms procurement bill, rather than at President Chen Shui-bian's (
As a Taiwanese saying goes, "A spoiled pig will destroy your stove and a spoiled child will not be filial." The US should not spoil China in exchange for China's cooperation in fighting terror and controlling North Korea's nuclear program. Instead, the US should appreciate and encourage Taiwan for trying to reinforce its status quo, including rectifying its official name and deploying the mechanism of the popular vote as a free, democratic country like the US.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
Taiwan no longer wants to merely manufacture the chips that power artificial intelligence (AI). It aims to build the software, platforms and services that run on them. Ten major AI infrastructure projects, a national cloud computing center in Tainan, the sovereign language model Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine, five targeted industry verticals — from precision medicine to smart agriculture — and the goal of ranking among the world’s top five in computing power by 2040: The roadmap from “Silicon Island” to “Smart Island” is drawn. The question is whether the western plains, where population, industry and farmland are concentrated, have the water and
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
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