The inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS), held in Kuala Lumpur on Dec. 14, has brought the region's power politics into sharp focus. For Malaysia, which took the initiative in forming the EAS, it is the realization of a proposal made by former prime minister Mahathir Mohammed who, in the 1990s, first floated the idea of an East Asia Economic Caucus. At the time, the idea was squashed by the APEC forum. Time and China's acquiescence have now made that proposal a reality.
But, predictably, China is doing its best to ensure that the formation of this new political body doesn't weaken its grip on the region. It wasn't keen on India's participation, nor, for that matter, Australia or New Zealand's. But some of the ASEAN countries pushed for India's inclusion as a counter-balance of sorts to China, and Australia and New Zealand were probably included as a gesture to the West -- and to emphasize that the EAS is not an anti-US cabal.
As a result, the EAS is comprised of 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. But its core will consist of the ASEAN+3 (10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South Korea), with the second tier also including India, Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, the favored formula is ASEAN+3 (meeting among themselves, as they have in the past), followed by an ASEAN+6 summit.
India won't be happy being sidelined in this manner. The ASEAN+6 summit will more or less be asked to ratify decisions already made by ASEAN+3. And Japan would probably prefer an ASEAN+6 format without any intermediate ASEAN+3, in order to counter the strength of China and South Korea.
Whatever the future configuration of the EAS (it is a work in progress), its future will depend on the state of relations between China and Japan. Presently, their leaders are not even on speaking terms.
Understandably, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, in his role as the host, declared the EAS a success. But Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶), still seething over Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni war shrine, wasn't at all keen on meeting with his counterpart on the sidelines of the conference.
It must be said that Koizumi could defuse the situation somewhat by relocating the graves of indicted war criminals to another location. Although China and South Korea are the ones making this a major political issue (their economic relations with Japan remain healthy, however), other countries in the region are also baffled by Japan's insensitivity.
Writing in the Jakarta Post, Begi Hersutanto (a research scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta) said that Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine "show arrogance and insensitivity to neighboring countries ? [and] have the potential not only to jeopardize Japan's foreign relations, but also to endanger the prospects of regional community building."
There is a lot of hype surrounding the prospects of an East Asia community emerging along the lines of the EU. Japan is blamed by some for damaging the chances of this happening through its row with China. It is argued that with Japan and China in a state of undeclared hostility, an annual EAS will become more newsworthy for the state of Sino-Japanese relations than any progress in regional community building. There is, therefore, a sense that Japan should somehow make up with China on its terms.
The disagreement, though, is not simply about Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine. This flash-point is part of the broader issue of Japan's war-time aggression and its perceived lack of contrition. And the issue will not go away any time soon because it is too closely entangled in the regional power struggle.
China is now increasingly using Japan's war guilt as a lever to emasculate its rival's political role in the region. Tokyo is fully aware of this, which partly explains its stubbornness on the issue of the shrine visits. Because if it shows weakness on this issue, Tokyo might argue, there will be no going back. And its political role in the region will come to be dictated by China's power imperatives.
This would result not only in a docile Japan, but also one that would be required, at some point, to abjure its US alliance. Japan is apparently not prepared to pay that price, irrespective of what it might mean for the EAS.
At the same time, it is determined to make a pitch for the leadership of the region. According to Foreign Minister Taro Aso: "Japan is, for the countries of Asia, a `thought leader,'" a pioneer of sorts. In a keynote speech just a few days before the EAS in Kuala Lumpur, Aso expressed great optimism about a future East Asia community, calling it a Council of Optimists.
He reminded Japan's Asian neighbors of how it had come to their rescue with about US$20 billion in financial aid in 1998-1999 at a time when they were facing near economic meltdown. And, he said for added emphasis, "that period was just when Japan was in the middle of its own economic recession." In making these statements, the foreign minister seemed to be trying to make a case for Japan as the region's natural leader.
Addressing some regional doubts about Japan's alliance with the US, Aso said: "Japan's role as a stabilizing influence in the area of security clearly stems from the weight that the Japan-US military alliance holds."
"If this region was not peaceful and stable, the development of the Asian economies would never have been possible," he added.
There is no doubt that Japan is a natural heavyweight in the region, thanks largely to its economic power.
But where China excels is in its new-found diplomatic skills and ability to project an aura of humility. Its charm offensive has managed to create the impression that the future belongs to China, and that those who quibble about this fact will miss out. As a result, other nations are falling over each other to dispel any doubts about China's promise and jump aboard the new Asian bandwagon.
In comparison, Japan appears aloof and arrogant, unwilling to do the hard work necessary to create a web of official and non-official linkages with its Asian neighbors.
But the fact remains that Japan cannot simply be ignored, and indeed has decided to make a pitch for the region's leadership. And this will increasingly be reflected in the evolution of an East Asia community and in other regional organizations.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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