US Senator Joseph Lieberman, a US vice-presidential candidate in 2000, has raised the alarmist scenario of a possible future military conflict between China and the US, arising out of their competitive quest for the world's dwindling oil resources. He believes that the race for oil, unless cooled down through urgent talks between the two countries, could become "as hot and dangerous as the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union" during the Cold War period. And "this could end up in real military conflict, not just economic conflict," he recently told the Council on Foreign Relations.
Looking at it, the conflict could arise in two ways. First, as both countries scour the globe for new oil sources, this will create new areas of political and economic tension. The political fragility of potentially oil-rich countries in Africa and Central Asia will make the race even more combustible. Some of the countries being wooed by China, like Sudan, for instance, are hostile to the US. In Central Asia -- another oil-rich region -- the US and China (and Russia) are engaged in a repeat of the colonial era `Great Game' of edging each other out. All this is pretty dangerous stuff.
The second source of conflict could be the oil-related politics of China and US allies. Japan is a case in point. Japan and China are disputing their maritime boundary in the East China Sea, both eyeing its rich natural-gas deposits. China reportedly has already extracted gas from one field while Japan is heading in the same direction, though it hasn't yet started drilling operations.
Tokyo is also planning new legislation to empower its coast guard to protect Japanese rights. The talks between the two countries to resolve the issue are stalled, and their leaders are hardly on speaking terms. There are also deep political problems between the two countries from the last war, with China angry that Japan is trying to whitewash its historical sins.
Japan is the US' security ally. The US line is that it is not buying into the bilateral problems between China and Japan. Washington seems to believe that if the US managed to overcome its wartime antipathy toward Japan, despite Pearl Harbor and the subsequent war between the two countries, China might as well get over it and forge a new relationship with Japan.
But doing this would mean accommodating Japan as a regional heavyweight, which China is loath to do. China wants to turn the tables on Japan by creating its own version of an East Asian co-prosperity sphere by politically marginalizing Japan. In other words, the China-Japan relationship is quite complex, with their maritime dispute only compounding an already difficult situation. And if things were to get too hot between them, the US might not be able to stay out, being as it is Japan's military ally.
The same goes for Taiwan, where the US has obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.
It is not suggested that there is a war just around the corner between China and the US. Indeed, it is not imminent despite the dramatic scenario painted by Lieberman. But it is a fluid situation and things can be unpredictable. The point to make is that it is not just the quest for oil which might put the US and China on a collision course at some time in the future. The overriding factor is that China is seeking to emerge as an alternative superpower.
China, though, has factored continuing general tensions with the US into the equation; with President Hu Jintao (
What this means is that Beijing is not anticipating a military conflict with the US, at least not in the near future. In other words, it wouldn't provoke one when it is on such unequal terms with the US.
Lieberman's suggestion that the US and China have "got to start discussions before the race for oil becomes dangerous," elevates China to the same status as the US, with the assumption that the rest of the world is somehow a passive element in this power game. This is an arrogant and dangerous assumption to say the least. For instance, where would Europe, India, Japan and others fit into this bilateral carving up of the world's oil reserves?
In any case, China is not keen to have limits put on its energy use contending that, on a per capita basis, the US is already using many times more energy than China. In other words, there is no shared starting point. According to Lieberman, "China, bottom-line, needs assured access to sources of oil."
If so, who is going to make that possible? It is unlikely that the US or any other country or countries can give that kind of assurance to China. Fortunately, Lieberman is only a senator, although a powerful one. But it is a dangerous line of thinking to deal with China over the heads of the rest of the world. Anyway, China doesn't think that its development strategy will lead to war. Its message to the world, worried about its future direction, is that there is no need to worry, because they will be different from many big powers in history that "rose and caused earthquakes." Why?
Simply because, as a senior Chinese diplomat put it, "the world has changed. It's not like in the past when powers had to expand territorially in order to get markets," or raw materials. In a new "globalized" world China will simply use the tools of a capitalist economy to come out on top, though it might take a long time because of its huge population and internal social problems.
The message to the US is equally conciliatory. According to China's ambassador in Australia "We believe co-operation with the US is very important for us. We are not interested in competing for world power. We have too many people to worry about."
But this is all semantics and Beijing is very good at it. It is true that China has many internal problems. But that doesn't prevent it from projecting its power, as it is already doing.
Without its emerging superpower image, China's communist regime has very little legitimacy at home. It is now a national project to make China into a superpower and everything must fit into place.
But Beijing is not stupid enough to collide with the US. It will let trade and diplomacy do the work, while steadily building up its military machine as an important and ultimate prop.
Lieberman is right to worry, but China will choose its own time.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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