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The DPP needs to make policies
By Chiu Hei-yuan 瞿海源
Monday, Oct 31, 2005, Page 8
In a recent telephone interview with the BBC, I was asked about whether the "New DPP" reform movement of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was similar to that of the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) "New KMT" movement, as both dragged their respective parties into a quagmire of internal division. I responded that it was normal for the DPP to be plagued with internal division, so this situation was different from the KMT.
Not long after this, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) reproached the younger DPP members who initiated the "New DPP Movement" for using the type of language that had previously been used by the "New KMT" movement. The DPP has certainly un-dergone extensive changes in recent years and Chen's response may indicate a fear that the new movement could divide the party. He sharply reined in the movement's initiators. After the president had spoken out, through the mediation of the DPP chairman, a temporary truce was reached and the term "New DPP" quickly vanished.
Subsequently, with the backing of younger DPP lawmakers, a proposal for 10 major reforms proposed by the DPP legislative caucus was passed. The proposal added four more issues to the six reform priorities addressed by Chen during his Double Ten National Day speech this year. The four reforms are related to government-owned stock bonuses, payment for honorary government posts, dual monthly incomes of retired officials and legislative reform. Rumor has it that the DPP legislative caucus will establish 10 different taskforces to push forward these reforms. However, the direction of the DPP's reforms up to now has caused mixed feelings. The positive side is that we see that the DPP still has the motivation and impetus to carry out reform. The negative side is the public's suspicions about whether there is any meaning to these reforms and what benefits they will bring to the public.
The four additional reforms do not seem to be difficult to accomplish. For example, cutting the salary of national policy advisers and consultants to the president seems to be supported by lawmakers of both the ruling and opposition parties. Also, the goals of prohibiting retired officials from receiving a double income and establishing a system of providing government-owned stock bonuses in order to eradicate any illegal acquisition of money should not be difficult. Although these three draft reforms are considered as plausible and concrete in terms of social justice and administrative ethics, they are still not regarded as being fundamental structural reforms. As a result, problems remain and they cannot be solved by simply cutting paychecks.
It was very inappropriate for Chen to give only one media outlet his interview. What's worse is that in his capacity as president, Chen seemed grouchy and pushy throughout the interview and defended himself against accusations that he always rewards his henchmen by giving them government patronage. Chen even believes that there is nothing wrong with employing people such as former vice presidents as presidential advisers. However, the crux lies in how Chen structures his personnel. When Chen spoke of former vice presidents, he was probably referring to former vice president Lee Yuan-zu (李元簇). However, the question here is why Chen wanted to hire only Lee as a national policy adviser and ignored former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰), who also used to serve as vice president. After all, both of them were KMT vice presidents. It is even stranger that Chen arranged for a former DPP legislator who lost in the party preliminaries for the year-end local government elections, to take up a governmental post. This use of national resources to handle party issues is disgusting.
Even if Chen has quite a few national policy advisers and presidential advisers, it is unlikely that these people will be able to provide any advice. The recent resignation tendered by national policy adviser Huang Wen-hsiung (黃文雄) may reveal a lot about the problems Chen is facing. Chen can certainly do without national policy advisers or presidential advisers, because his policies are never shaped by them. In fact, it all boils down to the decisions Chen makes. If we cannot conduct radical reform and change the situation, the president could become a dangerous dictator.
Since the DPP came to power it has been in a predicament, for it is simply unable to map out national policy and implement it effectively. In terms of decision-making, Chen does not seem receptive to different ideas. Besides, there is still a lot of room for improvement in terms of important decisions made by the Executive Yuan, the DPP legislative caucus and the DPP itself. Since the Executive Yuan is in charge of mapping out government policy, it has to be responsible for all the government's failures.
The DPP legislative caucus should have had a dependable mechanism for formulating dec-isions rather than only serving as a rubber stamp for decisions made by the Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan. If a party is only hellbent on winning elections, it does not have to be responsible for government policy. However, the DPP is more than a electoral machine and the party should play a more active role in formulating national policy and should even seek to reach a consensus on policies of national importance, and check and balance those in power to bring about genuine reform.
Chiu Hei-yuan is a sociology professor at National Taiwan University.
TRANSLATED BY YA-TI LIN AND DANIEL CHENG
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