Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou's (
The remark caused me to turn pessimistic about the new discourse, for it suggests that Ma is continuing to make an us-and-them distinction between the KMT and the Taiwanese.
The kind of public discourse that Ma is seeking to establish requires the collective participation of the public, for only by giving it significance and realization can it be established as a social discourse. But the very group that Ma's discourse is aimed at appealing to -- namely those Taiwanese who have rejected the KMT -- are unable to participate in the discourse as it is structured.
The reason is that Taiwanese continue to be regarded as "them" under Ma's formulation, rather than part of "us." Taiwanese remain the object, rather than the subject of the discourse.
While seeking to locate the KMT's link with Taiwan prior to 1945, Ma even spoke of a bottle of whisky that a Taiwanese, who was a victim of the 228 Incident, had received from Sun as a gift. Ma used this to prove that KMT had connections with the local society prior to its arrival in Taiwan in 1945, and that it was therefore not a foreign regime. But this only underlined the fragility of the KMT's historical tie to Taiwanese society.
If the KMT wants to create a truly powerful discourse, it must drop what we call the "KMT's Taiwan discourse," and make Taiwan the subject of the discourse, which would be "Taiwan's KMT discourse." And what would such a discourse be? In a phrase, it would be to accept that "the KMT was once a foreign regime."
The KMT was indeed a foreign regime when it moved to Taiwan between 1945 and 1949. The KMT should acknowledge this. It should respond by saying that this is in the past, and that after the process of localization, it is no longer a foreign regime, nor will it be one in the future. If the KMT's official history had adopted this local perspective, then it could rightly justify saying that the party has blended into Taiwanese society, and the accusation that the KMT is a foreign regime would not have persisted.
Instead, to avoid localizing the party and to negate former president Lee Teng-hui's (
But the problem the KMT currently faces is not whether it was a foreign government back in 1945, but why, 50 years later, it is still accused of being a foreign regime. Ma has provided the wrong answer, and is asking the wrong question. By continuing to emphasize the KMT's historical connection with Taiwan, he has put the party on dangerous ground.
The accusation that the KMT is a foreign political force can easily be deflected by a localization discourse, but instead Ma reveals that the KMT is unable to give up the idea of its primacy in its relationship with Taiwan, needlessly leaving itself open to attack by critics.
As soon as Ma starts talking about the KMT's connections with Taiwan, he unites Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) heavyweights against him. Premier Frank Hsieh (
But looking at the problem from a wider perspective, this ganging up on Ma is a disturbing situation, for it suggests that Ma's KMT discourse could lead to a worsening of relations between ethnic groups with different political orientations.
We can imagine the political debate that will precede the 2008 presidential elections, which will take place in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics. If debate focuses on the KMT's historical role, the place of birth and local associations of each leader, it will split Taiwanese society, and in conjunction with strained relations with Beijing and external pressure, the damage that it could do to Taiwan does not have to spelled out.
Whether Ma is looking after his own interests, those of the KMT or those of the nation, he must understand that his political party discourse should aim at bringing people together.
In other words, Taiwan's political parties should engage in a dialogue that is built on a position of "Taiwan first," seeking consensus rather than closing off from each other by making unilateral declarations intended to appeal to the old guard but which are contrary to the popular will.
To put it even more bluntly, if the two main parties engage in an ideological battle over identity, the KMT will certainly be the loser, and Taiwan's future will be the victim. Ma's discourse is intended to solve the contradictions between the KMT and local society, but instead he is simply giving his enemies a stick to beat him with.
Instead, he should simply accept the localization argument of "Taiwan first" and actively engage the DPP in an effort to achieve rapprochement and cooperation, and build an interparty relationship. As the leader of the main opposition party and a possible presidential candidate, Ma should engage Hsieh in frank and well-intentioned theoretical and policy debate (Hsieh advocates a political philosophy of cooperation and coexistence), and also draw Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) into a push toward interparty cooperation in the legislature. This would be much more constructive than looking for connections in the dust of history, and enable Ma to create a discourse that would be more persuasive than his current one.
Jou Yi-cheng is a director of the international department of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.
Translated by Daniel Cheng and Ian Bartholomew
Saudi Arabian largesse is flooding Egypt’s cultural scene, but the reception is mixed. Some welcome new “cooperation” between two regional powerhouses, while others fear a hostile takeover by Riyadh. In Cairo, historically the cultural capital of the Arab world, Egyptian Minister of Culture Nevine al-Kilany recently hosted Saudi Arabian General Entertainment Authority chairman Turki al-Sheikh. The deep-pocketed al-Sheikh has emerged as a Medici-like patron for Egypt’s cultural elite, courted by Cairo’s top talent to produce a slew of forthcoming films. A new three-way agreement between al-Sheikh, Kilany and United Media Services — a multi-media conglomerate linked to state intelligence that owns much of
The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13. The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said. Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan. Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has no official diplomatic allies in the EU. With the exception of the Vatican, it has no official allies in Europe at all. This does not prevent the ROC — Taiwan — from having close relations with EU member states and other European countries. The exact nature of the relationship does bear revisiting, if only to clarify what is a very complicated and sensitive idea, the details of which leave considerable room for misunderstanding, misrepresentation and disagreement. Only this week, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations
Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear. In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.” That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald. The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under