President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) told an envoy from South Korea yesterday that he would be delighted to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting for heads of state in Pusan this November.
How serious is he about this? Is he just trying to grab some headlines away from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and its internecine strife? Or is he determined to force the issue of Taiwan's unfair representation at APEC to the limit? If the latter, what is the real political objective?
Taiwan's APEC representation has always been a scandal. Taiwan joined the organization in 1991 as an economy, not as a sovereign state. In this regard it had the same status as Hong Kong. But nevertheless, Taiwan's president and foreign minister were banned from attending APEC-related activities. Whether the Lee Teng-hui (
Everything changed in 1993 when the leaders' summit was established. In theory, the leaders' meeting is not a formal APEC gathering, therefore the rule applying to Taiwan's APEC membership -- no president at APEC meetings -- does not apply. Nevertheless China has mendaciously tried to assert that the rules of formal APEC meetings should also apply to the informal leaders' summit, and no other member or combination of members has so far been willing to shout Beijing down.
As a result Taiwan has had to undergo a piece of flim-flam which is supposed to be face-saving, but in fact does little more than rub salt in its wounds. The host country sends an invitation to Taiwan's president, which he finds he must sadly decline. Then he appoints a representative to go in his stead -- which for the last three years, has been Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan-tseh (
There is no requirement for leaders at the informal leaders' summit to be "sovereign" -- hence the presence of the Beijing-appointed apparatchik who runs Hong Kong -- and there is no reason why Taiwan's leaders should not go to the summit other than that China has said its leader will not attend if he does. Most APEC members think a summit without China is rather like Hamlet without the prince, and so Taiwan has always been pressured to back down.
Is Chen really ready to call their bluff? There are three possible outcomes. Chen could attend the meeting, in which case Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) won't and Taiwan will be widely criticized for "wrecking" the summit. Or pressure could be put on the Koreans to withdraw the invitation to Chen -- probably under some nonsensical excuse such as its being incompatible with Seoul's "one China" policy. Or Taiwan will be forced into a humiliating, last-minute climb-down and Lee Yuan-tseh will have some quick packing to do.
This paper has always considered APEC fatuous, so "wrecking" the summit doesn't bother us. It would, however, draw a huge amount of negative publicity Taiwan's way and is more likely to make those leaders who do attend angry over the waste of time and loss of grandstanding opportunities then to prick their consciences about Taiwan's level of representation.
The other two possible outcomes both involve a slap in the face for Chen, if he is as determined as he seemed to be yesterday. But perhaps this is his strategy. Given the overwhelming stupidity of the current China fever among Taiwanese -- some of whom would sell their birthright to export a container of mangoes -- Taiwanese need to be reminded that China is not their friend. It could well be that Chen is setting himself up for a humiliation, to stage a little morality play in the most brightly lit arena available.
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