People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (
As far as I can see, it must have taken a lot of effort to reach a consensus, given that Beijing's position regarding the "Taiwan question" has remained basically unaltered, it must have fallen to the leaders of the two Taiwanese parties, who actually share the same political background and whose parties have few differences when it comes to cross-strait relations (one exception being the 10-point consensus reached between Soong and President Chen Shui-bian (
Not only do six "points" come out of the meeting between Hu and Soong, compared with five between Hu and Lien, but this second agreement seems more substantial, more concrete.
In point of fact, the agreements reached on both of these meetings require negotiations between the authorities on both sides of the Strait before they can come to anything. Beijing pulled out all the stops in arranging these visits by the two chairmen. Could it really all have been just for the sake of arriving at these agreements?
Some would say that it's more about giving the outside world a positive impression about Beijing's attitude towards peace in the Taiwan Strait, following the passage of the contentious "Anti-Secession" Law. For me, this take on the situation not only underestimates the political astuteness of the leadership in Beijing, it also misreads Beijing's strategy towards Taiwan.
Compared to Jiang Zemin (
Jiang, on the other hand, tried to cover up the number of SARS cases in military hospitals, and fled to Shanghai during the crisis. Hu was able to turn this crisis to his advantage, and the way he dealt with it enabled him to consolidate his power base.
Second, Hu only took control of the Central Military Commission in September, consolidating both political and military power. He quickly brought in the Anti-Secession Law to address the Taiwan question, deflecting the challenge that the Taiwan issue presented to his authority. He was also able, through the Lien and Soong visits, to establish an anti-Taiwan independence front and to re-open cross-strait dialogue.
The majority of people in China see the decade or so of Jiang's leadership as failing both to win over the Taiwanese people or rein in the pro-independence faction. During these years, the two sides grew further apart and the Taiwanese independence movement ever stronger. Ever since Hu Jintao came onto the scene, he has proven himself to be more than a match on the Taiwan issue, even using it to strengthen his own power base.
Should we continue to employ the same old methodology and mindset when it comes to dealing with a leader like this?
I believe that Beijing is viewing the Anti-Secession Law as a watershed and a milestone in its Taiwan policies, regardless of what Taiwan thinks of the law. After the law's passage, Beijing has started a new round of peaceful attacks, and this new wave of Taiwan policies are similar to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) series of attacks on Taiwan following the standing committee of the 9th National People's Congress's 1979 Message to Taiwan Compatriots.
It is therefore important to gain an accurate understanding of the changes to the CCP's policies and military and other strategies following the passage of the law. Compared to before, Beijing's Taiwan policies now put more emphasis on proactive attacks, differentiated treatment, mixing a soft and a tough approach, and affecting Taiwanese society and the minds of the Taiwanese people. The current cross-strait party exchanges show that the main thrust of Beijing's Taiwan policies is to begin at the source in its attempts to complete its work in Taiwan.
Unless I misunderstand the CCP's Taiwan policies, "affecting Taiwanese society and the minds of the Taiwanese people" was the main purpose behind the CCP's reception of Lien and Soong. Beijing has long thought that Taipei has been demonizing its Taiwan policies, and so Beijing after careful planning added a new plot to its Taiwan effort by staging Lien's and Soong's visits.
A comprehensive look at the importance Beijing gave to the reception of Lien and Soong shows that each reported meeting and talk focused on the recognition of the "1992 consensus," opposition to Taiwan's independence, and promotion of unification being prerequisites for cross-strait peace and development.
This was true for the host's meticulous arrangements as well as for the guests' lavish praise for the CCP -- not a word of well-meaning or negative criticism passed over their lips.
Beijing successfully and without the slightest problem transmitted the position and goodwill it wanted to transmit to the people of Taiwan. That was probably Beijing's ultimate goal and its greatest gain from Lien's and Soong's visits.
Faced with Beijing's active attempts at reaching a consensus with Taiwan's opposition some people think that Beijing is trying to use the people of Taiwan to force the government and the opposition to circumscribe its options. In order to avoid becoming marginalized, it will thus be difficult for the government to take over from the opposition.
But the government should also be aware that, given the CCP's Taiwan policies, the CCP will only be happy if the government does not want to take over, while also lacking effective planning and the ability to explain that decision, because this would show that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government is basing its rule on the interests and ideology of the DPP while ignoring the public's best interests. That could cause the DPP's China policies to collapse.
Faced with Beijing's new strategic thinking on Taiwan, the government should also come up with some new thinking. Beijing's reaction to the elections for the National Assembly and the question of whether Taiwan would be accepted into the World Health Assembly on May 16 was evidence of Beijing's attitude.
The government and opposition should make good use of the conciliatory atmosphere and the opportunity that follows in the wake of Lien's and Soong's visits to China and actively bring about inter-party reconciliation and dialogue. They should also set up the planned cross-strait peace development commission. They should then use this once again to consolidate a domestic consensus and build a peaceful and developing cross-strait relationship. These are the most urgent tasks facing both the government and opposition parties.
Andy Chang is a professor in the Graduate Institute of China Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Paul Cooper and Perry Svensson
Two sets of economic data released last week by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) have drawn mixed reactions from the public: One on the nation’s economic performance in the first quarter of the year and the other on Taiwan’s household wealth distribution in 2021. GDP growth for the first quarter was faster than expected, at 6.51 percent year-on-year, an acceleration from the previous quarter’s 4.93 percent and higher than the agency’s February estimate of 5.92 percent. It was also the highest growth since the second quarter of 2021, when the economy expanded 8.07 percent, DGBAS data showed. The growth
In the intricate ballet of geopolitics, names signify more than mere identification: They embody history, culture and sovereignty. The recent decision by China to refer to Arunachal Pradesh as “Tsang Nan” or South Tibet, and to rename Tibet as “Xizang,” is a strategic move that extends beyond cartography into the realm of diplomatic signaling. This op-ed explores the implications of these actions and India’s potential response. Names are potent symbols in international relations, encapsulating the essence of a nation’s stance on territorial disputes. China’s choice to rename regions within Indian territory is not merely a linguistic exercise, but a symbolic assertion
More than seven months into the armed conflict in Gaza, the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to take “immediate and effective measures” to protect Palestinians in Gaza from the risk of genocide following a case brought by South Africa regarding Israel’s breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The international community, including Amnesty International, called for an immediate ceasefire by all parties to prevent further loss of civilian lives and to ensure access to life-saving aid. Several protests have been organized around the world, including at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) and many other universities in the US.
Every day since Oct. 7 last year, the world has watched an unprecedented wave of violence rain down on Israel and the occupied Palestinian Territories — more than 200 days of constant suffering and death in Gaza with just a seven-day pause. Many of us in the American expatriate community in Taiwan have been watching this tragedy unfold in horror. We know we are implicated with every US-made “dumb” bomb dropped on a civilian target and by the diplomatic cover our government gives to the Israeli government, which has only gotten more extreme with such impunity. Meantime, multicultural coalitions of US