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Beijing's strategy is easy to misread

People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) have met, following the meeting between Hu and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰). All eyes have been on these two events, and observers from all over the globe have been poring over the minutiae of the Hu-Soong six-point communique, and comparing it with the five-point agreement arrived at between Lien and Hu, to see if there are, in fact, any differences between them.

As far as I can see, it must have taken a lot of effort to reach a consensus, given that Beijing's position regarding the "Taiwan question" has remained basically unaltered, it must have fallen to the leaders of the two Taiwanese parties, who actually share the same political background and whose parties have few differences when it comes to cross-strait relations (one exception being the 10-point consensus reached between Soong and President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), to make the running.

Not only do six "points" come out of the meeting between Hu and Soong, compared with five between Hu and Lien, but this second agreement seems more substantial, more concrete.

In point of fact, the agreements reached on both of these meetings require negotiations between the authorities on both sides of the Strait before they can come to anything. Beijing pulled out all the stops in arranging these visits by the two chairmen. Could it really all have been just for the sake of arriving at these agreements?

Some would say that it's more about giving the outside world a positive impression about Beijing's attitude towards peace in the Taiwan Strait, following the passage of the contentious "Anti-Secession" Law. For me, this take on the situation not only underestimates the political astuteness of the leadership in Beijing, it also misreads Beijing's strategy towards Taiwan.

Compared to Jiang Zemin (江澤民), Hu Jintao is as skilled an administrator and crisis manager. One might cite a couple of examples. First, not long after Hu came to power, he was thrust straight into the SARS crisis. This he dealt with in a transparent, responsible manner, showing regard for both the law and the people.

Jiang, on the other hand, tried to cover up the number of SARS cases in military hospitals, and fled to Shanghai during the crisis. Hu was able to turn this crisis to his advantage, and the way he dealt with it enabled him to consolidate his power base.

Second, Hu only took control of the Central Military Commission in September, consolidating both political and military power. He quickly brought in the Anti-Secession Law to address the Taiwan question, deflecting the challenge that the Taiwan issue presented to his authority. He was also able, through the Lien and Soong visits, to establish an anti-Taiwan independence front and to re-open cross-strait dialogue.

The majority of people in China see the decade or so of Jiang's leadership as failing both to win over the Taiwanese people or rein in the pro-independence faction. During these years, the two sides grew further apart and the Taiwanese independence movement ever stronger. Ever since Hu Jintao came onto the scene, he has proven himself to be more than a match on the Taiwan issue, even using it to strengthen his own power base.

Should we continue to employ the same old methodology and mindset when it comes to dealing with a leader like this?

I believe that Beijing is viewing the Anti-Secession Law as a watershed and a milestone in its Taiwan policies, regardless of what Taiwan thinks of the law. After the law's passage, Beijing has started a new round of peaceful attacks, and this new wave of Taiwan policies are similar to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) series of attacks on Taiwan following the standing committee of the 9th National People's Congress's 1979 Message to Taiwan Compatriots.

It is therefore important to gain an accurate understanding of the changes to the CCP's policies and military and other strategies following the passage of the law. Compared to before, Beijing's Taiwan policies now put more emphasis on proactive attacks, differentiated treatment, mixing a soft and a tough approach, and affecting Taiwanese society and the minds of the Taiwanese people. The current cross-strait party exchanges show that the main thrust of Beijing's Taiwan policies is to begin at the source in its attempts to complete its work in Taiwan.

Unless I misunderstand the CCP's Taiwan policies, "affecting Taiwanese society and the minds of the Taiwanese people" was the main purpose behind the CCP's reception of Lien and Soong. Beijing has long thought that Taipei has been demonizing its Taiwan policies, and so Beijing after careful planning added a new plot to its Taiwan effort by staging Lien's and Soong's visits.

A comprehensive look at the importance Beijing gave to the reception of Lien and Soong shows that each reported meeting and talk focused on the recognition of the "1992 consensus," opposition to Taiwan's independence, and promotion of unification being prerequisites for cross-strait peace and development.

This was true for the host's meticulous arrangements as well as for the guests' lavish praise for the CCP -- not a word of well-meaning or negative criticism passed over their lips.

Beijing successfully and without the slightest problem transmitted the position and goodwill it wanted to transmit to the people of Taiwan. That was probably Beijing's ultimate goal and its greatest gain from Lien's and Soong's visits.

Faced with Beijing's active attempts at reaching a consensus with Taiwan's opposition some people think that Beijing is trying to use the people of Taiwan to force the government and the opposition to circumscribe its options. In order to avoid becoming marginalized, it will thus be difficult for the government to take over from the opposition.

But the government should also be aware that, given the CCP's Taiwan policies, the CCP will only be happy if the government does not want to take over, while also lacking effective planning and the ability to explain that decision, because this would show that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government is basing its rule on the interests and ideology of the DPP while ignoring the public's best interests. That could cause the DPP's China policies to collapse.

Faced with Beijing's new strategic thinking on Taiwan, the government should also come up with some new thinking. Beijing's reaction to the elections for the National Assembly and the question of whether Taiwan would be accepted into the World Health Assembly on May 16 was evidence of Beijing's attitude.

The government and opposition should make good use of the conciliatory atmosphere and the opportunity that follows in the wake of Lien's and Soong's visits to China and actively bring about inter-party reconciliation and dialogue. They should also set up the planned cross-strait peace development commission. They should then use this once again to consolidate a domestic consensus and build a peaceful and developing cross-strait relationship. These are the most urgent tasks facing both the government and opposition parties.

Andy Chang is a professor in the Graduate Institute of China Studies at Tamkang University.

Translated by Paul Cooper and Perry Svensson
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