The proposition that Taiwan and China should sign an interim agreement has once again become a major topic of discussion. Some applaud such an idea, while some oppose it. There are actually two ways of proceeding with such a proposal, namely, signing just one interim agreement, or signing multiple agreements.
A singular interim agreement would be an accord signed by Taiwan and China which would stipulate that during the next 30 to 50 years, Taiwan would agree not to declare formal independence, in exchange for a pledge by China not to attack. The signing of such an agreement would be to Taiwan's disadvantage, for once China promises not to take Taiwan by force, Taiwan will find it difficult to maintain a substantial military capability and the US would think that it no longer needs to sell advanced weaponry to the country. Thus, China will be the one that continues to build itself up militarily; whereas Taiwan will fail to acquire better weapons from foreign countries. In the long run, the nation will lose its ability to defend itself in a modern war with China.
What's more, once such an accord is signed, it would cause Taiwan to gradually lose its psychological readiness for war with China. Once China is certain that Taiwan is no longer defending itself psychologically, it will alter its strategy and go on the offensive against Taiwan.
A few years ago, the Military Intelligence Bureau published a study of the Emperor Kangxi's (
Clearly, an interim agreement will only lead Taiwanese to believe that there won't be a war across the Taiwan Strait. But when China decides to reverse its policy, as the Qing Dynasty did before, Taiwan will be defeated. The fall of Koxinga's Taiwan should give present-day Taiwanese food for thought.
The signing of multiple "interim agreements" means that before the Taiwan question is settled, Taipei should seek to sign other kinds of agreements with Beijing to resolve specific disputes. If Taipei can sign numerous agreements with Beijing, in the long term it could achieve lasting peace across the Strait.
This is the type of strategy that Stanley Roth, former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, upholds. When President Chen Shui-bian (
When the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was in power, the Mainland Affairs Council intended to sign an interim agreement with China to resolve issues including the deportation of Chinese hijackers, illegal immigrants and a host of maritime disputes. However, China had no intention of reciprocating, primarily because it had to call Taiwan "the other party" when inking such an accord. This form of address is tantamount to recognizing that both sides are on an equal footing, violating Beijing's cherished "one China" principle. That is why Taipei could not get Beijing to sign an agreement like those proposed by Roth.
The signing of only one interim agreement will only disarm Taiwan and spell doom for the nation. But the signing of issue-specific agreements will resolve the disputes that currently exist across the Strait.
Trong Chai is a DPP legislator
TRANSLATED BY DANIEL CHENG
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