The meeting between President Chen Shui-bian (
Before the meeting, Soong had more to worry about, such as a potential backlash from PFP supporters. Many PFP supporters are prone to lashing out irrationally. In contrast, the pan-green supporters in general are more sympathetic about Chen's need to work with the PFP to gain a legislative majority. Of course, this does not mean they can forgive Chen for selling out pan-green ideals.
Moreover, the PFP's survival depends almost entirely on Soong. If he is discredited by the PFP's supporters, the party is finished. For Soong personally, it would be the end of his political career. On the other hand, Chen is already serving his second term as president. After he steps down, the DPP will have to decide whether to continue his legacy. In other words, even if the pan-green camp's supporters reject the cooperation with the PFP, the DPP does not necessarily have to take the rap.
Seen against this backdrop, Chen actually made some bold concessions in the 10-point joint statement issued after the meeting. The most noteworthy points in the statement are the following: First, during the remainder of Chen's term, there shall be no declaration of independence, no change of the country's name, no promotion of the "special state-to-state" discourse, no referendum on unification or independence, and no revoking of the national unification guidelines; and second, there shall be cross-strait negotiations on comprehensive direct charter flights or direct cargo links based on this year's Lunar New Year holiday flights.
Of these two points, the former is probably the biggest disappointment to the pan-green supporters. After all, Chen was elected president on a campaign platform advocating the rectification of the national title and the drafting of a new constitution -- all interpreted by his supporters as paving the way for independence or at the very least reinforcing the existing sovereignty of Taiwan as a country. This concession is essentially a major slap in the face of the pan-green supporters. Some have quickly come to Chen's defense by arguing that he was simply reiterating his first-term inaugural promises. But the problem is this: The people of Taiwan have come a long way since then in terms of building up national identity, and backtracking to a position taken five years ago is a major concession.
While the statement says that the future of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait shall be decided by the "people," it does not specifically say that the "future of Taiwan" shall be decided by the "people of Taiwan." The statement that no model for a cross-strait relationship should be ruled out as a possibility suggests that both unification and independence are viable options, so long as the people agree. But since Chen has promised not to hold a referendum on unification or independence during the remainder of his term, the people of Taiwan are essentially being deprived of the right to have any say on the issue for a long time.
While it has long been predicted that the Chen government will probably seek to establish direct cross-strait links based on this year's direct charter flights, it is nevertheless appalling that an official commitment was made as part of a bargain with Soong in such a manner.
In a nutshell, Chen will have a lot of explaining to do to his supporters for his pact with the devil.
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