Speaking of Sino-US relations, the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) said the US had three governments: the executive, Congress and the judiciary. It was not enough to do the work of the White House and the various Cabinet positions, he said, for there was another government in the shape of Congress, which was constantly proposing measures that favored Taiwan.
When the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took power in 2000, they were in a situation not dissimilar to that of the Clinton administration -- facing a legislature controlled by the opposition. For President Chen Shui-bian (
One would have expected that Chen would view Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (
On the issue of direct flights for the Lunar New Year, the Mainland Affairs Council commissioned Michael Lo (
Beijing's attitude is the key to resolving the charter flights issue. The flight schedule and possible delays are also in the hands of the Chinese. The DPP and the KMT are merely supporting actors in this drama. Even as China was in the process of framing its proposed "anti-secession law," it was able to make both the DPP and KMT grateful for the goodwill offered by the possibility of charter flights. But now, both parties are fighting over who gets the credit for the agreement reached on the flights, depriving the nation of the ability to pressure Beijing to make concessions on other issues.
In dealing with US-Taiwan relations, any Taiwanese leader is likely to stumble over issues in which the US and China are moving toward agreement, and as a result face an uphill battle against the two countries.
There are also other issues that isolate Taiwan in its triangular relationship with China and the US, including the "one China" principle, the "small three links," their attitude toward Taiwan's independence and their refusal to allow Taiwan into the UN.
In the past, communist China stood on the wrong side of history, and so the US helped Taiwan prevent China from attacking, but at the same time hindered former president Chiang Kai-shek's (蔣介石) ambitions to "retake the mainland." Now that Taiwan has a higher level of democracy and autonomy and no longer regards itself as a part of China, the US is less able to exercise control over Taiwan's actions -- and this has made it uneasy.
US policy is contradictory, and it has a double standard toward democracy. It supports Taiwan's democracy, but does not support its desire for self-determination. The US either acknowledges or agrees with China's "one China" principle, but doesn't have the courage to openly regard Taiwan as a part of China. As such, the US is clearly giving in to Chinese pressure.
Given the ambivalent US position, both sides of the Taiwan Strait urgently want the US as their partner to put pressure on their adversary.
While both sides of the Strait hold fast to their political strategies, they assume a moderate attitude when dealing with minor issues, but use this to convey to the US that their side is flexible in negotiations. Against this backdrop, the belief that the US should be a helper rather than an adversary in cross-strait relations is beginning to take shape.
The greatest danger for Chen is to find himself simultaneously fighting Taiwan's opposition parties, China and the US at the same time. The reasons the US is dissatisfied with Taiwan, apart from other issues, is because of requests that the US reassess its "one China" policy, improve its treatment of visiting Taiwanese officials, opposition boycotts of the arms deal and its suggestion that it would target Shanghai in the event of a cross-strait war.
In contrast, the instances in which the US has harshly criticized China have decreased, while Taiwan's domestic situation has become increasingly divided. In the eyes of the US and China, it is Taiwan which seeks to change the status quo.
This may be because of successes in Chinese propaganda, but this is how the situation is perceived. It also goes to show that if Taiwan carries on with the "two governments" in the US, it will find itself fighting opponents both inside and outside the country.
Lin Cheng-yi is the director of the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica.
TRANSLATED BY Ian Bartholomew
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