The Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress has begun discussing anti-secession legislation. This move has caused concern in parts of Taiwan's society and shows that Taiwan must strengthen its psychological defenses and self-recognition. China's hegemonic attitudes and ambition to annex Taiwan must be condemned.
From a legal perspective, the "anti-secession law" is but a domestic Chinese law. If Taiwan considers itself a country (leaving the discussion of national title aside), the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is international in nature, which means that international law should apply and that Chinese domestic legislation is not binding on Taiwan.
The Chinese Constitution has long included an article defining Taiwan as being part of China's "sacred territory." But when was this article ever valid? Since Taiwan sees itself as an independent state, it is not part of China. So what does it matter to Taiwan if China passes an anti-secession law?
One important benchmark for national independence is that no other state holds jurisdiction in that state. This being so, no law passed by China has any power in Taiwan.
A case in point is China's inclusion of the Diaoyutai islands in its territory in the Law on China's Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas in 1992. It has no legal effect in Japan, and is merely a political statement aimed at Japan.
China has stated that the anti-secession law is a special law aimed specifically at Taiwanese independence. Not only does it not apply to Hong Kong or Macau, it doesn't apply to separatist activities in Tibet or Xinjiang either, and this is in fact quite illogical. The use of an "anti-secession law" instead of a "unification law" in fact excludes the East-West Germany, North-South Korea and EU models as well as the confederation, federation and commonwealth models, and uses legislation to state clearly that China is unified.
A "unification law," at least in name, recognizes that the two sides are separately ruled, but predefines unification of the two as the only future option. An "anti-secession law," however, does not comply with the current status since it defines the two parties as domestic, and it makes China the definer, lawmaker, judge and executor.
From the proposal for a unification law to the initiation of the anti-secession law, the pressure on Taiwan has increased. The anti-secession law defines the current status as both sides of the Taiwan Strait being one entity, and attempts to give the outside world the impression, wrongly, that China is the keeper of the cross-strait status quo.
However, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have long been separated. Why else would there be a need to discuss unification? If it was a matter of civil war, there would only be the problem of who the ruler would be, and no problem regarding unification.
China's unreasonable declaration that Taiwan is a part of it is the same as Iraq's legislation making Kuwait its 18th province. As far as the cross-strait situation goes, this is definitely a matter of unilaterally changing the status quo, and a serious provocation.
China is attempting to manifest its determination to block Taiwan's independence by adopting an anti-secession law, and is also making the mistake of believing that such a law is an important deterrent to US intervention in the cross-strait issue. The result, however, may be similar to the result of China's Taiwan policy white paper published in February 2000, which instead reversed Taiwan's strategic disadvantage in the triangular Taiwan-US-China relationship.
The US is demanding that Taiwan not change the status quo, and has even said that Taiwan is not a sovereign state, that the two sides of the Strait should be peacefully unified, that the US has no duty to defend Taiwan and that Taiwan is part of China.
It has used this to apply pressure on Taiwan. The anti-secession law might, however, lead to US concerns that China may use military force against Taiwan. Because the US is opposed to the use of military force by China to resolve the Taiwan issue, and because it hopes a solution to the cross-strait issue can be approved by the people of Taiwan, Taiwan should make good use of this opportunity and launch an intense effort to explain to the US government, and academic circles, that the anti-secession law may change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. It should also rebuild mutual trust between Taiwan and the US to change the strategically disadvantageous situation in which it has found itself over the past two years.
It is worth noticing that we absolutely must not bow to China's threats and coercion, because that would encourage China to take military action even sooner. China is not a country ruled by law, and a Chinese decision to take military action is related to its military strength, not to whether Taiwan crosses the line.
The only way for Taiwan to avoid a war across the Taiwan Strait is to strengthen its national and psychological defenses to make China understand that the cost of war would be too high, instead of fearing attack.
It must be remembered that the enemy is most afraid of that which they are doing their utmost to prohibit us from doing.
Translated by Perry Svensson
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
The Legislative Yuan passed an amendment on Friday last week to add four national holidays and make Workers’ Day a national holiday for all sectors — a move referred to as “four plus one.” The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who used their combined legislative majority to push the bill through its third reading, claim the holidays were chosen based on their inherent significance and social relevance. However, in passing the amendment, they have stuck to the traditional mindset of taking a holiday just for the sake of it, failing to make good use of
RSS