Certainly, the diversity of forms of governance used over the centuries by Russia, Poland, Lithuania and Austria-Hungary when they ruled what is now Ukraine make creating a classic "nation state," with one dominant culture, difficult to imagine. Consider, for example, the robustness of the Russian language and the strength of the Orthodox Church -- Moscow Patriarchate -- in Donetsk that is in eastern Ukraine and the robustness of the Ukrainian language and the influence of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Lviv in the west.
Yet Spain, India, Belgium and Switzerland are all consolidated democracies that do not fit the classic model of the nation state. Indeed, multiple but complementary identities are the norm in all four countries.
These multiple identities emerged because the democratic state provided a "roof" of equal rights above all citizens, whatever their religion, language, or culture. This helped develop a strong sense of identity with the statewide political community. These profoundly pluralistic countries are not classic "nation states," but rather what I call democratic "state nations."
During the recent presidential election, many suggested that reconciling the "two Ukraines" was impossible. But polarization has not been a constant factor in the history of independent Ukraine. On the contrary, Ukraine is closer to being a "state nation" than many people think. Moreover, its prospects for becoming a consolidated democracy are enhanced by the fact that its political elites -- and most ordinary Ukrainians -- have eschewed the idea of being a classic "nation state."
Indeed, more than 80 percent of Ukraine's Russified eastern districts voted for independence in 1991, and the 1999 parliamentary and presidential elections did not split the country nearly as much as the presidential elections this year did. A survey in 2001 of the two supposedly most polarized cities, Donetsk and Lviv, showed convergence in their approval of independent Ukraine, with only 1 percent of respondents in Lviv and 5 percent in Donetsk preferring that Ukraine be divided into two or more countries.
As in other "state nations," surveys in Ukraine indicate that common symbols have helped build elements of a common identity. Both ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians view the 10th-century feudal state known as "Kyiv Rus" very favorably. Moreover, both groups share the 17th-century Cossack warrior Bohdan Khmelnytskyi as their most popular historical figure, and both revile Stalin due to the famines caused by his forced collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s (whereas most ethnic Russians in Russia view Stalin as the heroic state savior of World War II).
These shared attitudes toward Ukrainian symbols and statehood owe much to a recognition that independence will not be well protected by forging a classic nation state, that is, a "Ukrainian Only" state. Thus, the country's declaration of independence 13 years ago was made in the name of "The people of Ukraine," and citizenship was offered to everyone who was born on the territory of Ukraine, regardless of nationality.
I was invited as an adviser to two constitutional committee meetings in Kyiv in the 1990s. My impression from the discussions was that both Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine were acutely aware of the need to avoid ethnic conflict. In fact, an informal state-building alliance of convenience emerged between key non-communist Ukrainian nationalists and key pro-sovereignty, ethnic Russian communists.
The perception of "two Ukraines" emerged in the presidential election this year partly due to the charge that Yushchenko would eliminate the constitutional guarantee that ethnic Russians could use Russian as their primary language of instruction in schools. But during his campaign Yushchenko assured Russophones that he would uphold such rights.
Finally, much of what has been described as "secessionism" in the east is in fact regionalism. Greater legally respected decentralization in Ukraine, especially in Crimea, would be a logical and overdue "state nation" policy.
The other major issue raised during the Orange Revolution concerns presidential powers. Many Yushchenko loyalists are unhappy that, in exchange for the government agreeing to fairer election rules, Yushchenko agreed to transfer some presidential powers to the parliament. Not withstanding the self-serving intentions of outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, this historic pact may in the long run produce positive results for Ukraine's democracy and prospects for joining the EU.
The Ukrainian Constitution of 1996 adopted a model of governance close to the French style semi-presidentialism created by Charles de Gaulle for the Fifth Republic: a directly elected president with significant executive powers and a prime minister responsible to parliament. This system works best when the president and the prime minister come from the same political party or coalition.
But, as in Russia under President Vladimir Putin, Kuchma vastly increased presidential powers in Ukraine. Indeed, no real democracy in the world has such unchecked presidential authority.
A look at the eight postcommunist countries just admitted to the EU is instructive. Four -- Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia -- are parliamentary. The other four -- Slovenia, Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia -- have directly elected presidents, but none comes constitutionally and politically close to Kuchma's Ukraine. Like Portugal in the 1980's, they adopted semi-presidential systems that so reduce presidential authority and increase the parliament's powers that they are most accurately described as "parliamentarized semi-presidential" systems.
This is the model toward which Ukraine could be moving, however unwittingly. If so, the presidency would most likely cease to be a potential source of ethnic polarization, thereby strengthening the common identity that both Ukrainian and Russian citizens are committed to upholding.
Alfred Stepan is Professor of Government at Columbia University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
Two sets of economic data released last week by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) have drawn mixed reactions from the public: One on the nation’s economic performance in the first quarter of the year and the other on Taiwan’s household wealth distribution in 2021. GDP growth for the first quarter was faster than expected, at 6.51 percent year-on-year, an acceleration from the previous quarter’s 4.93 percent and higher than the agency’s February estimate of 5.92 percent. It was also the highest growth since the second quarter of 2021, when the economy expanded 8.07 percent, DGBAS data showed. The growth
In the intricate ballet of geopolitics, names signify more than mere identification: They embody history, culture and sovereignty. The recent decision by China to refer to Arunachal Pradesh as “Tsang Nan” or South Tibet, and to rename Tibet as “Xizang,” is a strategic move that extends beyond cartography into the realm of diplomatic signaling. This op-ed explores the implications of these actions and India’s potential response. Names are potent symbols in international relations, encapsulating the essence of a nation’s stance on territorial disputes. China’s choice to rename regions within Indian territory is not merely a linguistic exercise, but a symbolic assertion
More than seven months into the armed conflict in Gaza, the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to take “immediate and effective measures” to protect Palestinians in Gaza from the risk of genocide following a case brought by South Africa regarding Israel’s breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The international community, including Amnesty International, called for an immediate ceasefire by all parties to prevent further loss of civilian lives and to ensure access to life-saving aid. Several protests have been organized around the world, including at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) and many other universities in the US.
In the 2022 book Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, academics Hal Brands and Michael Beckley warned, against conventional wisdom, that it was not a rising China that the US and its allies had to fear, but a declining China. This is because “peaking powers” — nations at the peak of their relative power and staring over the precipice of decline — are particularly dangerous, as they might believe they only have a narrow window of opportunity to grab what they can before decline sets in, they said. The tailwinds that propelled China’s spectacular economic rise over the past