The Double Ten National Day speech by President Chen Shui-bian (
This is a time when China is strengthening its power and Taiwan is strengthening its identity, raising difficult and dangerous issues for the US to manage.
Koo's Oct. 4 statement, which called on the US to drop its "one China" policy, appeared in the Washington Post and the New York Times. Rumors quickly spread in Washington that China would protest, and that US President George W. Bush had been told the statement was inspired by Chen. A complaint from Beijing materialized, but the rumor about Chen seems a bit far-fetched.
For one thing, it is not so unusual in democracies such as Taiwan and the US for an individual to buy space in a newspaper to further his views. Koo had done this previously, on his own, without receiving such attention.
A few days after this, the symposium took place in one of the Senate's office buildings. China complained again. The Senate would doubtless not take kindly to any demand by the executive branch that its facilities be declared off-limits, and so that too was a non-starter for China.
There were three panels in the symposium, and though there were some fundamentalist senior members of the Democratic
Progressive Party on them, each panel also had American participants who encouraged a realistic approach and prudence in the pursuit of Taiwan's objectives. Over the following two days, there was also a "World Taiwanese Congress" attended
by various Taiwanese association leaders from Japan, Europe and various cities in the US. They were not connected with the symposium, but their political views mirrored those of present-day Taiwan.
I was disappointed not by the views I heard, but by the absence of China and Taiwan experts or government representatives. It almost seemed that -- rightly or wrongly -- attendance would make the government or China unhappy, or worse, that they didn't think it useful.
This may be stretching it a little, but in my view an opportunity was wasted.
First, they would have heard a range of views of what has become mainstream thinking in Taiwan -- from supporting the "status quo" out of fear of war to backing outright independence. Ignoring this or expressing one's displeasure by putting one's head in the sand is not going to help manage this increasingly complex relationship.
Second, their presence could have strengthened understanding of the importance in US eyes of Taiwanese prudence in managing the cross-strait relationship.
There is much to ponder in the broader tripartite relationship. One immediate task will be to determine what can or should be done once elections are completed and policy review begins. The US will need policies that take into account the mainstream opinion while maintaining good relations with China.
If one looks at what lies ahead for Taiwan -- a new constitution, a referendum and perhaps dialogue with China -- the US may find it necessary to become quite intrusive in Taiwan's domestic affairs. That's dicey in any event, and in any country. Foreign intrusion in domestic matters is never welcome.
The US will have to work with that reality. The core need is close, effective and broader communication with one another. In Taiwan, there are frequent symposiums that invite American and other scholars to take part. The US does this as well, but when it comes to Taiwan, it seldom if ever includes people who do not agree with US policy. This is unfortunate, as understanding is the base for better communication between governments.
One possibility in pursuing better government communication is for the US to establish a cross-strait task force made up of deputy assistant secretaries -- or people of equivalent rank -- from the State Department, the Defense Department, the National Security Council and perhaps others. This group would be tasked with producing a regular report to the president. The report could be drawn from a regular quarterly meeting of the group and their Taiwanese counterparts, and would include recommendations on any matter that should be addressed.
The Taiwanese side would be expected to start a similar process to ensure the president is well informed. There is a need for presidential aides on both sides to be kept well informed about this relationship.
Unfortunately, raising the frequency and level of communication tends to be seen in Taipei first and foremost in terms of high-profile visits or publicly announced bilateral meetings which strain the US' relationship with China. The biggest obstacle to more regular, higher-level liaisons between the US and Taiwan in national security matters, of course, is objections from China. Yet there have been similar, if less structured, liaisons in the past that were manageable. It does require trust, however, and broadening the number of people involved in this liaison strengthens government support on both sides.
There are doubtless many other possibilities for enhancing communication. The US has endorsed Chen's Oct. 10 speech, and one hopes that it could eventually result in a dialogue between Taiwan and China. Even so, it is unlikely to remove the US' need for a continuing and perhaps even closer relationship with Taiwan.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special advisor to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed are his own.
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