A paper on cross-strait policy was recently released by the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) and sent to President Chen Shui-bian (
The TSU also made several cross-strait policy proposals, such as compelling negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait through a discriminatory policy toward Chinese goods, and to make Chinese investors and Chinese visitors to Taiwan sign statements acknowledging the nation's sovereignty. The TSU also opposes setting up additional schools for the children of Taiwanese businessmen in China.
The paper starts by pointing out that after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came into power, thanks to the "active openness, effective management" policy, Taiwanese businessmen have become even more active in investing in China. While the policy was implemented based on the conclusion of the Economic Development Advisory Conference, the government has turned a blind eye to the part about "effective management."
For example, with respect to opening up investment in 8-inch foundry fabs by Taiwanese businessmen in China, the government has failed to severely punish those who invest without obtaining the needed permission. As a result, other firms began to follow those bad examples and even pressure the government to further open up investment.
The TSU and DPP are "siblings" and are equally firm on their stance regarding the independent sovereignty of Taiwan. Logically speaking, the cross-strait policies of these two parties ought to have much in common. However, during the first four years of Chen's presidency, the TSU launched severe criticisms against the government's cross-strait policy. The magnitude of the attacks was no less than those coming from the pan-blue camp. The difference was that the basis of the TSU's criticisms was diametrically opposite to that of the pro-unification pan-blues.
Those who do not know better may choose to interpret the TSU's criticisms as campaign tactics, thinking that the TSU is trying to clearly distinguish itself from the DPP in the fierce legislative election at the end of the year. Perhaps there's some truth in such thinking. However, it cannot be denied that the paper on cross-strait policy reflects a genuine concern about the ruling party's departure, from the principle of "Taiwan first" in cross-strait policy.
There's an irony here. The Chen government refuses to budge on the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty, and in fact intends to turn Taiwan into a "normal country" through amending the constitution. But guided by the imperative to ensure safety and peace in the Taiwan Strait, it had to show goodwill toward China, so as to avoid giving China any excuse to invade Taiwan. Politically, these goodwill gestures ranged from the promise of "five noes," to the discourse about "integration" between the two sides of the Strait to the talks about exchanging visits between the leaders of the two governments.
Other gestures include the establishment of schools in China for children of Taiwanese businessmen there, the gradual loosening of restrictions on investing in China by Taiwan's high technology industries, the trial "small three links" between Xiamen and Kinmen, the plans to let Taiwanese firms in China become publicly-traded firms in Taiwan's stock exchange and the extension of loans to Chinese firms by offshore banking units of Taiwanese banks. These were all measures taken under pressure from Taiwanese businessmen and the pro-unification camp and further made possible due to the biased thinking of some government officials.
As a result, the trend of Taiwanese businesspeople "going West" has become even more prevalent under the DPP than under the past rule of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). The investment of more than US$100 billion in China and the hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese businessmen who reside permanently in China have eroded the roots of Taiwan's industrial development and inflicted major damage on the nation's security.
No amount of goodwill shown by Taiwan can possibly change the Chinese ambition to take the country. During the early days of Chen's presidency, the thinking of "firm in one's stance, while flexible in one's tactics" was perhaps a necessary course of action in facing a bullying neighbor. However, as the country's leader shows goodwill toward the other side, he must also give consideration to the collective interests and security of Taiwan as a whole.
If goodwill is not only incapable of neutralizing the other side's ambition but actually empowers it, then should we continue to show goodwill and put ourselves in the deplorable situation of being subjected to the mercy of the enemy? That is a question the country's leader must think about. Cross-strait peace is of critical importance, but the country's opening-up policy in cross-strait relations has given rise to the erroneous idea that business can be separated from politics.
The biggest mistake of Taiwan in cross-strait policy is in skewing too much toward China on business and trade policies, and this will cause the country to gradually go into decline. By flocking to China and fantasizing about its huge market and cheap labor costs and rent, Taiwanese businessmen are courting their own demise. Further, their mass emigration is compromising the nation during a crucial time for transforming its industry and expanding its business, while simultaneously helping drive the growth of the Chinese economy.
Even more infuriating is that the fruits of China's economic growth, far from being distributed among the people are being used to increase China's military strength. This will lead to Chinese control over the whole region, and to the eventual overwhelming of Taiwan. It could be said that the fact that China is able to throw its military weight around and browbeat us is all Taiwan's own doing. The blame could be firmly placed on Taiwanese businessmen, but the government has done little to stem the westward flow. It is difficult to conclude anything except that the government's cross-strait policy is deeply flawed, with too much openness and insufficient management.
The DPP is no doubt aware of what the people want, and the Taiwanese need not doubt their fundamental stance in cross-strait relations. Nevertheless, if we look at what has happened over the last four years under Chen's government, we see an increase in localization and awareness of Taiwan and in support for rectifying the country's name, coupled with economic decline.
Taiwan is coming to resemble a sick man whose body is failing but whose mind remains clear. The TSU paper attributes these problems to the pernicious actions of China, but also paints a scary picture -- if the policy of openness continues -- of a sick man accepting a prescription from a devil. Now that Chen has secured his second term, he no longer needs to worry about votes, and he owes it to the people to carve out his place in history now.
The TSU paper has identified a potentially fatal wound caused by cross-strait policy. Chen's historical destiny is to lead the Taiwanese from under the shadow of China, and get the country out of its dire situation. That mission is also his political responsibility to the Taiwanese. The people of Taiwan will be waiting to see what happens over the next four years.
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