Never before in the history of the Olympics Games has a country receiving a gold medal been unable to hear its national anthem and see its national flag on display during the award ceremony. Optimists may say that sports and politics are separate matters. But for pessimistic thinkers, Taiwan's recent experience is cause for national sadness.
The country has already had a heated debate over the nation's name. All the names suggested -- "Taiwan, Republic of China" or "Taiwan, ROC" -- only show that Taiwanese are as much afraid of declaring independence as they are of being unified with China. Even as China arbitrarily puts down Taiwan in the international community, the nation still cannot consider a wording that doesn't include "China." People cannot help but ask: "Who are we?"
Who are we? is also the title of a new book by Samuel Huntington, a US political scientist whose theory about the clash of civilizations impressed global readers in early 90s. This time, instead of looking at international conflicts from a macro perspective, he focuses on internal US issues that arise from the coexistence of different ethnic groups. He criticizes recent Latin-American immigrants for their inability to leave behind their motherland and embrace the American dream. He argues that their maintenance of a strong ethnic identity -- one that is incompatible with that of the country's earlier immigrants -- will hamper progress.
Of course, we do not mean to adopt Huntington's view in its entirety. However, some of his points can be applied in the context of cross-strait relations. Political mistrust leads Beijing to constantly criticize the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government for its attempts to stop using the word "China" when referring to Taiwan. At the same time, Beijing blocks the use of the name Taiwan internationally. As a result, Taiwan is no longer called China, and China dares not let Taiwan be Taiwan.
Beijing's intention behind this is not difficult to grasp. It wants the Taiwanese people to feel confused about their own identity. Though this strategy may not lead to Taiwanese people identifying themselves with China, it prevents them from having a fixed identity and so makes it more difficult for Taiwanese people to establish their own country.
The establishment of a sovereign nationality requires collective will. Meanwhile, the population also relies on the country's power to direct and shape concepts surrounding its nationality. Therefore, in such an "imagined community," the collective force germinated from nationality must focus on building up a new country and dissolving the existing one. This is the most difficult step in the process of moving from the concept of "population" to a "nationality" and finally, to a sovereign "country."
China is attempting to interfere with Taiwan's collective will, thus staining its nationality and making the task of building a country nothing but a dream for the Taiwanese people. Beijing's international pressure to prevent calling Taiwan "Taiwan" is nothing but cultural hegemony. Unfortunately, rather than fight against such bullying, we jump into China's trap and thereby put our fate in its hands.
Obviously, name rectification is the only path to take to reach the goal of a sovereign country based on Taiwanese identity. If we don't call Taiwan "Taiwan," for generations to come, our children will never hear their national anthem or see their national flag in the Olympics. They will always wonder who, exactly, they are -- and that is the true sadness of being Taiwanese.
Wang Kun-yi is an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies of Tamkang University.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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