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Why war's the worst outcome for China

The Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China published by the US Department of Defense on May 28 expresses worries that China's goal of modernizing its military is making it more likely that China will take armed action against Taiwan.

The US' worries are not unfounded. Many of the attendees at a People's Liberation Army (PLA) symposium I attended in Nanjing in April this year said that "a war in the Taiwan Strait will eventually be required," and the attitude of Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin (江澤民) that "there will be war in the Taiwan Strait" was widely played up by high-ranking military leaders. The possibility of a cross-strait war has indeed been the focus of a lot of attention lately.

The question is if China could be certain of victory were it to start a war. The answer, I'm afraid, is unknown.

Many people in the PLA believe it would be impossible to restrict the extent of a potential war in the Taiwan Strait. They think a war would be certain to involve changes in the military situation in both the northeast and the northwest of China. They worry in particular that North Korea would stir things up in the northeast, and that separatists in the northwest would seize on the opportunity to create disturbances.

Military action in the Taiwan Strait would thus affect the overall regional balance of power, so if the PLA sets things in motion in the Taiwan Strait, all China would be immedi-ately thrown into a difficult situation.

In such a situation, the PLA might have to fight three kinds of war simultaneously: a high-tech war in the Taiwan Strait involving every branch of the military; a traditional war involving army and air force in the northeast; and a special forces war to stop terrorist attacks in the northwest. The PLA is clearly not able to handle three different kinds of war simultaneously.

If in the Taiwan Strait the PLA chose to adopt a decapitation strategy and begin an attack using missiles, it would face an immediate counterattack from Taiwan's army and the US' Pacific forces.

If the PLA then sent its fleet to attack Taiwan, it would be met by Taiwanese, US and Japanese missiles. In other words, the Chinese fleet might be sunk before even landing on Taiwan. The PLA might thus be forced to retreat even without the US and Japan having to send any troops.

If the PLA simply defined a war in the Taiwan Strait as a punitive expedition against Taiwan, Taiwan would of course declare independence in the event of an attack. China would thus have to retreat without achieving its objective, while Taiwan's independence would become a reality.

During the fighting, other countries might also recognize an independent Taiwan, and that is of course an outcome China does not want to see.

A war in the Taiwan Strait may upset China's internal and external security, particularly regarding US and Japanese attitudes toward a war.

As the US expressed satisfaction President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) inauguration speech, unless China now wants to continue the stand-off with Chen for another four years, pinning its hopes on the pan-blues, its only remaining choice to resolve the Taiwan issue, apart from engaging in contact with Chen, is to resort to war.

That is not only unrealistic, but may also be the worst choice for China.

Wang Kun-yi is an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies of Tamkang University.

TRANSLATED BY Perry Svensson
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