As a declared non-nuclear weapon state, Indonesia has always worked for nuclear non-proliferation -- indeed, for a world free of nuclear weapons. But the cause of nuclear non-proliferation is in deep trouble, as countries are once again tempted to acquire the means of oblivion.
For over three decades, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has been the cornerstone of the world's non-proliferation regime, a position that derives from growing acknowledgement of the legal and normative standards that it established. Adherence to the NPT has increased steadily, reaching a stage of near-universal acceptance.
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But there is a general feeling that implementation has fallen short of expectations, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. Moreover, there is increasing concern over non-compliance and the associated risks of proliferation to worrisome states, particularly in Asia, and even more ominously, into the hands of individuals and terrorist organizations.
In the face of these threats, what can be done to strengthen the non-proliferation regime? The NPT regime stands on three pillars: non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The treaty envisages the construction of each pillar through a matching series of steps taken by both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime in order to confront today's challenges would require no more than following this strategy.
Unfortunately, this has not been the case since 1995, when the NPT Review and Extension Conference made the duration of the NPT's validity indefinite. The conference, which included the original five nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, China, France and Great Britain) as well as many other UN members, did not reach consensus on a final declaration.
But it did adopt three other decisions, entitled Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and Resolution on the Middle East. These constituted a package that was meant to be implemented in its entirety.
Five years later, the 2000 review conference adopted a final document that contained concrete measures, including "13 practical steps" for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.
The NPT's adaptation to new environments and to problems that were not anticipated when it was adopted appeared to ensure the treaty's continuing effective implementation. But actions speak louder than words, and challenges to the NPT regime have continued to undermine its basic principles, causing considerable backsliding.
Today, the challenges posed by proliferation are more complex than ever. These include proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies by one de facto nuclear-capable state; one stated withdrawal from the NPT; one case of noncompliance; increasing assertion of the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines; and improvements in nuclear weapons by some nuclear weapon states.
The possibility that non-state actors could acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction poses an especially grave new threat. Confronting it effectively will require the support of all NPT signatories.
But a continuing imbalance and selectivity in the emphasis placed by different states on the treaty's three pillars damages the unity that the NPT regime needs. In particular, imbalances in implementing the NPT obligations by the nuclear haves and have-nots are sharpening.
For example, some countries want to develop smaller "usable" nuclear weapons designed for pre-emptive or preventive military action. Many non-nuclear weapon states, particularly those in the developing world, remain frustrated that peaceful nuclear cooperation is yet to be realized.
These challenges to the non-proliferation regime not only jeopardize the treaty's credibility, efficacy and viability; they also have cast doubt nuclear disarmament's future.
Deliberations and negotiations within the NPT regime and in other disarmament areas have reached a difficult stage, if not a stalemate. To jump-start progress, all NPT signatories should reaffirm that the treaty's provisions are mutually reinforcing and must be pursued jointly. The most dangerous force eroding the treaty's credibility is the inclination of some nuclear-weapon states to reinterpret past agreements at will.
Despite the treaty's shortcomings, the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear states fully comply with their obligations. This constrains the nuclear weapon states, fulfilling one of the NPT's most important goals. One of the best ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime would be to implement existing agreements fully. Selectivity and narrow reinterpretation can only weaken the treaty. Developing new non-proliferation mechanisms would waste time that we cannot afford, because new protocols would have a dubious legal basis and encourage further implementation imbalances. If we are serious about saving the non-proliferation regime, the time to act is now.
N. Hassan Wirajuda is Indonesia's minister for foreign affairs. Copyright: Project Syndicate
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