When talking about cross-strait relations, maintaining the status quo seems to be the key position for the US; it seems acceptable to China, and depending on their ideology or indecision, many in Taiwan favor it too. Deliberately or otherwise, maintaining the status quo to Taiwan amounts to kicking the can down the street for the next generation to deal with.
The number of new young voters who will have the opportunity to cast ballots in this next election in Taiwan is usually stated in the media as about 1.5 million. They are that next generation and one wonders how they feel about being handed this responsibility.
The US stand in encouraging the status quo may not be helpful in furthering the expansion of democracy around the world, an important national objective. But it does show the US electorate that the utmost is being done to keep their sons and daughters out of harm's way. Both of these factors are fundamental responsibilities of any leadership in a demo-cracy, and taking that stand is not an easy call. Making it more difficult are the US' regional security commitments, other important global national security interests and the type of government one must deal with in China.
But above these fundamental factors, there is the US commitment, embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act, to allow the sale of defensive arms to Taiwan and to maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or economic system, of Taiwan.
That is not an automatic commitment, but an important deterrent against force or other forms of coercion. It also makes especially sensitive for America the cause or nature of any action on either side of the Taiwan Strait that could lead to instability. Any change, therefore, from the US standpoint, must be peaceful -- that is America's status quo.
China does not react in the same way it did in the past to Taiwan or American behavior they deem unfriendly. There are a whole array of reasons observers can point to in explaining this. China has grown strong enough to join the world. It has become dependent on foreign investments and foreign trade. Its economy must continue to grow at the present rate or face social instability. Pressures for political reform keep growing. Growth has overtaken available domestic energy resources. It has, in other words, priorities that far surpass the cross-strait issue.
This is especially true as Tai-wan has already given China the base for its growing high-tech industry. Resources and expertise from Taiwan continue to be important to the Chinese, and they see Taiwan's economy increasingly dependent on China's. They also hope that a successor government in Taiwan will accept the "one China" principle, assuring that it will eventually become a part of China. That, from Beijing's standpoint, is what status quo means.
But equally important, what does status quo mean for Taiwan in policy terms, and what do the Taiwanese mean when asked in polls. Though there are several political parties participating in next year's presidential election, there are ideologically only two sides on this issue. One wants a strengthening of a separate sovereign entity that would negotiate its relationship with China on that basis; the other side would accept the "one China" principle and negotiate the terms for eventual unification. So in policy terms, Taiwan has two status quo options.
Which side is chosen is impor-tant not only for Taiwan's future, but will also influence what strategies China and the US might want to pursue as a consequence of the election's result.
China's present status quo strategy insists on absolute sovereignty over Taiwan and pursuit of "one country, two systems" under the "one China" principle. The US strategy for the present status quo is based on a Taiwan that is a separate but undetermined entity. In both cases, at least some of these strategies might have to change if the relationship between the two sides of the Strait changes. All of this depends on the outcome of next March's election and perhaps the outcome of the legislative elections in December next year.
But what do the voters who respond to pollsters mean by status quo? For many, how to respond depends on which side he or she stands in the election campaign. Status quo has been a popular response to polls for several years. In the 1990s, despite the vast changes brought on by democratization, in domestic affairs as well as cross-strait relations, the status quo, which broadly means no change, was the preferred response to polls. A lot has happened these last few years, and not just in government turnover.
China has changed drastically, in economic terms and in its need to be an active player in the international community. The repercussions of its economic growth and its military modernization had nothing to do with government change in Taiwan. The US' attention has had to change drastically in light of a new and vastly different type of security threat. That too had nothing to do with the government change in Taiwan. Despite all these enormous changes that have taken place both at home and abroad, maintaining the status quo still seems to be the stated preference for a majority in the polls.
Some of the better polls overcome this reluctance to make a choice by seeking where the respondent would stand on the issue of cross-strait relations in the future. In that case, two choices make up a large majority that want either to defer making a choice for the indefinite future, or defer making any decision.
The people are facing different circumstances in March. There will be only two choices available in the voting booth on the course Taiwan will take into the future. Neither will permit a cop-out, but each go in a different direction.
Already there is one group that is encouraging voters to invalidate their ballot to show displeasure, but this could also be another form of cop-out. That would be irresponsible under the country's present circumstances. Taiwan is facing the necessity of restructuring its economy and reforming a large part of its government to meet the challenges it must cope with now. At the same time, China is also trying to strangle Taiwan's participation in the international community, and it is rapidly building its military potential to coerce Taiwan.
The people's decision in the election will determine the direction the country will go to address these problems. That next generation that is voting for the first time will be participating in decid-ing what kind of status quo they will have in the years ahead.
Nat Bellocchi, former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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