The 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) concluded on Nov. 15. Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) ascended to the post of the party's General Secretary. Jiang Zemin (江澤民) seceded from the Politburo Standing Committee but retained his position as the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Many domestic and foreign experts who predicted that Jiang will retire completely from China's political scene were taken aback.
At that time, some people argued that Jiang had stepped down and that he will succumb to Hu as the new leader. Jiang's name and photograph, however, appeared before Hu's in the People's Daily the next day. Over the following ten days, Jiang's photograph appeared ten times in the People's Daily, but Hu's appeared only once.
Let us turn the clock back fifteen years.
The 13th National Congress of the CCP concluded on Nov. 2, 1987. Zhao Ziyang (趙紫陽) became the party's General Secretary and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) withdrew from the Politburo Standing Committee but continued to serve as the chairman of the Central Military Commission. The following day, Deng's name and photograph appeared behind Zhao's in the People's Daily.
A sharp contrast emerged between these two otherwise similar events. Although Jiang lacks the kind of splendid military reputation, solid political authority and popular charisma that Deng had, his vainglorious style has betrayed the edifying model established by Deng.
Jiang is able to keep his position as the chairman of the Central Military Commission after making his exit from the Politburo Standing Committee, thanks to the precedent set by Deng.
But, does this precedent include a time-limit? Deng relinquished his position as the Central Military Commission's chairman after the Fifth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee in November, 1989.
He only spent two years in the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission after his withdrawal from the Politburo Standing Committee.
Hu's present-day status is no match for that of Jiang's, but what will become of it hereafter?
Jiang appears to have tremendous influence and power. The seeds of some negative factors, however, have been sowed. Hu seems cautious and passive, submissive to Jiang's control.
But, for many years, Hu has plodded steadily forward, and has been active through surrogates. Hu's potential, therefore, should not be overlooked and besides, he is sixteen years younger than Jiang.
Jiang's current momentum derives from five sources. First, he promoted 64 of 81 generals of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which enabled him to really take charge of the military. Second, five of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee are Jiang's proteges. Third, Jiang made a historical breakthrough when he "smuggled" the "Three Represents" into the party charter, thereby launching the transformation of Chinese society into what could be called"capitalism with Chinese characteristics." Fourth, his policy toward the US met with initial success, by "giving priority to cooperation and down-playing conflict." Visits have been frequent between the top officials of Beijing and Washington. Military exchanges have also resumed. Fifth, he repaired China's geopolitical position which was weakened after the Sept. 11 attacks and stabilized relations with Russia, Islamic states and China's neighboring countries. In fact, Jiang's present-day level of influence has reached new heights compared with the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks last year.
Below the surface, Jiang has already planted the seeds of decline. First, he has suffered, for quite some time, a number of ailments. Rumor has it that he relies on the treatment of "physical therapists," who are really qigong masters, to boost his vitality and stamina. Second, he silences his political opponents by "anti-corruption" measures.
Those who are unhappy with Jiang will possibly resort to the same "anti-corruption" measures to subdue Jiang in the future. For example, the resistance to Jiang can be seen from the fact that his son, Jiang Mianheng (江綿恆), is unable to become even an alternate member of the Central Committee. The young Jiang is his father's "Achilles' heel" because of the junior's extensive involvement in telecommunications. Third, the fact that Jiang did not fully retire after the 16th National Congress has disappointed many members of the CCP. These members include the party elders and young cadres, as well as various leaders of the third generation, including Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基). Bearing in mind that Jiang's penchant for pomp has put himself above Deng, they are waiting for a critical moment to make a move. Fourth, most of the leaders in the Jiang clique have regional power bases with bottom-up support -- they do not owe their promotion this time wholly to Jiang.
Will they always follow Jiang's orders in the future? For example, Li Changchun (李長春), a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, has cultivated power bases in the provinces of Liaoning, Henan and Guangdong -- his rise as a provincial leader began no later than Jiang's. More recently, Jiang has allegedly expressed discontent with Zeng Qinghong (曾慶紅) who has been perceived to incrementally move closer to Hu. Fifth, Deng's term as the chairman of the Central Military Commission after he stepped down from the Politburo Standing Committee only lasted two years.
No one in Beijing has openly discussed this sensitive issue. Should Jiang wish to stay longer than two years, the outcome may not be pretty. After all, Mao Zedong's (毛澤東) oft-quoted phrase, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," rings in their ears.
Hu has shown five apparent traits. First, he neither forms nor recruits cliques and factions. Second, he is not apt to take the initiative. Third, he always respectfully defers to "Chairman Jiang." Fourth, he refrains from touching the sensitive issues such as relations with the US and Taiwan, as well as politically charged structural reforms and so forth. Fifth, he is not in good health.
Further observations produce a different picture. First, Hu has almost no enemies. Even Zeng who is considered to be Hu's main rival already showed signs of willingness to cooperate with him. Second, Hu has gained acceptance from the military. Although not yet "backed" by the military, getting "accepted" is no easy task. Hu has fared better than his predecessor, Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), who was opposed by the military. Third, Hu enjoys the blessings of Hu Yaobang's halo; who is the most popular figure -- alive or dead -- in China today. Fourth, Hu has potential support from the Tsinghua faction (composed of graduates of Tsinghua University in Beijing), including the many technocrats promoted by Zhu and the mainstream of those who have returned to China after studying abroad. Fifth, Hu is backed by most graduates of Central Party School since 1992 when he was appointed its director. Sixth, for many years Hu has been active through surrogates to establish contacts with the US and Taiwan and to escalate the levels of elections at the grassroots level and democracy within the CCP.
Several years ago, a think-tank in the US told me that a visiting delegation from Beijing which claimed to represent Hu wished to establish channels with the US. In 2000, some Central Party School graduates who claimed to represent Hu attempted to make contact with Taiwan's emerging ruling party, the DPP, twice in Hong Kong. In 1998 and 1999, the unprecedented direct elections that took place in some townships of Sichuan Province were said to be quietly promoted by the provincial committee somehow linked to Hu's people.
What is so special is that many of the "counter-revolutionary" events that took place at the Central Party School in recent years are related to Hu. Zheng Bijian (鄭必堅), the deputy director of the school who recently stepped down, was Hu's assistant and an old-time comrade in the Communist Youth League. Zheng challenged many taboos in the school. In the beginning of last year, there was a discussion on whether the CCP should change its name to Chinese Socialist Party. This year, the school invited Harvard professors to give lectures and speeches. The school also invited Milton Friedman, a Nobel laureate in economics who was more capitalist in thinking than most capitalists. The school's publications have continuously discussed how to expand grassroots elections and intra-party democratization.
Some say that Hu has the biography of Tokugawa Ieyasu (德川家康) in his study room. Tokugawa was a Japanese military leader and statesman who founded the shogunate in Tokyo (formerly known as Edo) in 1603. The Tokugawa regime, a centralized feudalism, lasted more than 260 years. Tokugawa himself endured disgrace and insults all his life, but he established the highest authority one year before he died in 1616.
Hu will establish his leadership sooner or later if his health condition allows. But, even if Hu breaks away from Jiang's control, Hu's central authority will probably not be as powerful Jiang's today.
His power as general secretary will be diluted because the number of the Politburo Standing Committee members has increased from seven to nine. When Hu becomes the real top leader, Beijing's power and prestige will still surpass those of regional governments but to a lesser degree.
After the 16th National Congress, 56 percent of the Politburo members and alternate members have provincial career roots (14 out of 25 members), as opposed to 20.8 percent after the 15th National Congress (only five out of 24 members). The fact that the number has almost doubled suggests that the rise of regional power has become irresistible.
When we, in many years, look back upon the major changes in China to come, we will probably find many answers in the 16th National Congress.
Lin Chong-Pin is an adjunct professor in the Graduate Institute of Mainland Studies at the National Sun Yat-sen University.
Translated by Grace Shaw
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