Talk is growing of a change in US defense doctrine to allow for pre-emptive strikes on states that harbor weapons of mass destruction.
That talk is sending shudders across Europe, where many people connect it with America's oft-stated desire to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power.
Ever since the Gulf war, Iraq has been a source of friction among the Western permanent members of the UN Security Council. By the end of 1999, divergence was complete -- the US and Britain were employing their air power to enforce the no-fly zones while France joined Russia and China in abstaining on resolution 1284.
ILLUSTRATION: YU SHA
As this UK-sponsored resolution was meant to bring the Iraq issue back to the Security Council after the withdrawal of the UN weapons inspectors and subsequent American air strikes of December 1998, hope for progress on Iraq within the Security Council was scant.
This rapidly changed after Sept. 11. On May 14, the Security Council gave the tottering sanctions regime a new lease on life by unanimously adopting a simplified screening procedure. Even Iraq showed signs of being prepared to consider a possible return of the UN weapons inspectors.
At first sight this seems to bode well for the transatlantic relationship. In reality, the current relaxation is more likely a lull before the storm. Most Europeans take it for granted that the US will attack Iraq and that this act of unilateralism, coming in the wake of all the other irritants such as the ABM Treaty, the Kyoto Agreement, the steel tariffs and the International Criminal Court, will have a devastating effect on transatlantic relations.
Europe would be ill-advised to become mesmerized by this approaching disaster. Everyone understands that the Iraqi government's improved attitude is caused by the George W. Bush administration's saber-rattling, but no one can tell whether this is a prelude to an inevitable war or a stratagem to make Iraq cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. Obviously, the US cannot remove this uncertainty without robbing the saber-rattling of its beneficial effect.
Given this ambiguity, there remains time for Europe to engage the US in a serious discussion of the options for dealing with Sad-dam. The common aim should be to remove the threat posed by a dictator with so well-documented a predilection for weapons of mass destruction. The options vary from resumed inspections to "regime change."
There are arguments which make the choice far less clear-cut than it may seem. Several of these are also being advanced within the Bush administration.
Europe can constructively participate in such discussion provided if it first clears the way by:
One, ridding itself of its constant indignation about the conduct of the Bush administration. That indig-nation seems strongest among those who have not even bothered to read the US arguments. Europe does not increase its influence by berating the US for acting in its national interest.
Two, showing some understanding for the view of some in the Bush administration that the US should not be bogged down by a continent that is soft, decadent and moralizing. This is not a pleasant way of putting it, but many Americans remember how on two occasions in the former Yugoslavia -- a pre-eminently European theatre -- Europe was helpless until American warplanes showed up.
Three, making clear that Europe and the US are on the same side, not only in the war on terror generally but also in dealing with Saddam. The demonstrations that will rock European cities the day Iraq is attacked must be counter-acted in advance by unequivocal European statements to that effect.
This debate about how to deal with Saddam might go as follows. It is not difficult to overthrow Saddam, but it is impossible to predict who or what will take his place. Iraq may even disintegrate, leaving us with a much stronger Iran, also a member of Bush's "axis of evil" but one with a more dangerous mix, namely nuclear ambitions plus fundamentalism.
Moreover, Saddam may already possess a weapon of mass destru-ction but has been deterred from using it. Once he is attacked by the US, he may use it against Israel, which will retaliate. So it may well be wiser to induce Iraq to re-admit the UN weapons inspectors and make sure they can do their job. This will not entirely remove the Iraqi threat but will make it
controllable.
Should this be the outcome, European governments would breathe a sigh of relief. But the debate may also go the other way. Saddam will cooperate with UN inspectors only as long as the American threat remains, and the US may conclude that it cannot afford that. If Bush then opts for regime change, Europe should not opt out. This is easier said than done. Many Europeans will argue that they cannot condone military action without a Security Council mandate.
But they already did, twice. They condoned or even supported US air strikes against Baghdad in December 1998 and they supported or even participated in NATO's air strikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999. True, some will say, but that was under former president Bill Clinton's administration.
If Europe conveys the impression that its friendship with the US depends on who wins the US presidential elections, it is likely to freeze the transatlantic relationship for years. That hardly seems a rational policy for a continent in profound transition.
Peter van Walsum represented the Netherlands on the UN Security Council in 1999 and 2000. During that time he was chairman of the Iraq Sanctions Committee.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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