At the center of world attention, Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), the Chinese crown prince in waiting, has just concluded a visit to the US.
Hu is set to head the fourth generation of Communist Chi-nese leaders. With Hu's accession, China will officially enter the post-revolutionary era. It will then become difficult to understand political developments in China on the basis of historical, revolutionary heritage and logic. This is one of the main reasons why those outside China fears this power transfer.
Hu has so far been completely overshadowed by political leaders from the revolutionary generations and so there are few clues as to who he really is. He remains an enigma to mainstream political leaders in the non-Chinese world. Add to this his consistent caution and deliberately low profile and he becomes even more impenetrable to foreign politicians.This allows him to spin an invisible protective web around himself, both in domestic politics and in international matters. Whether this web will allow him to pull off a delicate balancing act between conflicting domestic and international pressures -- and whether he will succeed in getting a stable hold on power, however, remain to be seen.
Since the beginning of the post-Mao era, China has consistently developed a quintessential realism. Its foreign policy has become more and more circumscribed by national interest. As the transfer of power to a new political generation heralds the arrival of the post-revolutionary era, this realism may yet receive even greater emphasis.
With the beginning of the post-revolutionary era, the gradual retreat of historical pressures and the formation of an awareness of a rising China, however, Hu may turn out to be a bit more self-confident and more willing to adopt a liberal approach when looking for opportunities to cooperate with capitalist countries and build relationships of mutual reliance between China and the capitalist world.
Whereas the political leaders of China's revolutionary generation tried to oppose and destroy the international capitalist system, the leaders of the post-revolutionary generation will seek to participate in the continuous development of that system. Therefore, neither a purely realist nor a purely liberal approach will suffice to explain China's foreign policy behavior in the post-revolutionary era. A constructivist perspective must be added to the equation.
Hu's visit to the US signaled the beginning of post-revolutionary Chinese foreign policy. The following questions should be kept in mind when observing the interaction between the US and China and the development of their foreign policies: How do Beijing and Washington define their strategic environments? What domestic political limitations will restrict the two from developing closer cooperation? Will cooperation be able to overcome the obstacles and problems lodged deep within the framework of US-China interaction?
In the 1970s and 1980s, the traditionally hostile relationship between Beijing and Washington gave way to a common opposition towards the Soviet Union, and mutual cooperation. It is very difficult to imagine any factor that would cause the two sides to set suspicion aside in favor of close cooperation in the same way that opposition to the Soviet Union did. Given the war on terror, the two may do their utmost to avoid matters that could cause their relationship to deteriorate. Trade and exchanges of visits will continue to develop positively. Conflicts over human rights and arms proliferation will remain, but will not result in any drastic action. The two sides will continue limited cooperation while tensions between them remain.
US visits by Chinese leaders will not change this situation.
Lee In-ming is a professor at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University.
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