The brutal attacks on political and economic centers in the US on Sept. 11 have generated worldwide condemnation against global terrorism. President George W. Bush's pledge to hunt down the murderers and the forces behind them demonstrates the US government's determination to crack down on terrorism.
Once the strong feelings generated by the attacks have dissipated, however, a more profound debate will become the focal point of Americans' attention. That is, what is the priority for US foreign policy? More importantly, what elements should be incorporated into the US homeland defense policy?
Backed by the overwhelming support of the public, the US government is taking a hard line against international terrorism. The tenets of official US counter-terrorism policy are: make no concessions or deals with terrorists; bring them to justice for their crimes; isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism; and bolster the counter-terrorism capabilities of countries willing to work with Washington.
While these tenets are sound, their application, specifically overseas, raises difficult questions. Does the "no deal" policy actually deter terrorist acts? Are there cases where agreements might reduce terrorism, while advancing other US interests? Do isolation and pressure really force offending states to alter their support for terrorists? What factors affect the willingness, not just the capability, of foreign governments to help the US to counter terrorism?
To answer these questions, we must first identify the necessary elements of a counter-terrorism policy. Why, for example, is the US a prime terrorist target? Why is it that counter-terrorism policies that seem very strong are not always the most effective?
The fact is that terrorism cannot be defeated. It can only be reduced, attenuated, and, to some degree, controlled.
The Bush administration appears to be of two minds on national missile defense. At times, it has expressed rather modest ambitions. In his May 1 speech on the subject at National Defense University, for example, Bush focused on the threat that could be posed by just a few missiles from so-called "rogue states" and hinted at the possibility of developing a new framework with Russia for nuclear weapons and defensive systems.
On the other hand, administration officials, including the president, have been dismissive of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, displaying no interest in modifying it to allow for a small-scale national missile defense. They have an interest in many different possible anti-missile technologies, suggesting a multi-tier and large-scale defense architecture.
These positions, together with the stances of previous Republican administrations and the personal views of many of Bush's top advisers, suggest interest in an unconstrained and ambitious missile defense.
If the administration opts for such an ambitious plan, Russia and China could feel strategically threatened and respond in ways that might exacerbate weapons proliferation problems and harm US security. In addition, fiscal constraints may mean that other programs designed to protect the US and its allies against weapons of mass destruction and terrorism will be shortchanged.
It is not just a question of money. If the administration remains fixated on missile defense, it may not pay enough attention to other threats. Con-gress should therefore attempt to broaden the homeland defense agenda beyond the narrow scope of missile defense, and indeed beyond the purview of the Department of Defense alone.
Given the various threats to its citizens and society, the US might be better advised to diversify its homeland defense investment portfolio. Rather than devote all of a US$5 billion increase in next year's budget to long-range missile defense, it should improve response capabilities against numerous dangers.
In addition, the US might also: increase security at borders and points of entry; increase security for key physical infrastructure; make greater preparations to manage and mitigate the consequences of any mass casualty attack on its soil; up-grade human-intelligence programs in counter-terrorism; expand cooperative threat reduction efforts and develop and ultimately deploy national cruise missile defense.
Defending against missiles will do the US little good if an enemy can simply sneak weapons of mass destruction into the country. The threat should not be overstated; delivering a "suitcase bomb" is not as straightforward as is sometimes claimed. A fledgling nuclear power would probably be unable to produce a bomb weighing much less than a tonne -- hardly something that could fit into a suitcase and possibly even difficult to fit into a car or small plane.
In addition, if a country waited to try to bring such a weapon into the US until a time of crisis or war -- it would have a much harder time evading detection because of heightened security. But the threat is real, nonetheless, particularly for a scenario in which terrorists employ chemical or biological agents.
The US is hardly defenseless at its borders today. But it inspects only a small fraction of containers and manages to stop only a small fraction of drug contraband entering the country. Perfect border, port, and airfield security cannot be achieved. But a number of concrete steps must be taken to further complicate the task of any group or country attempting to smuggle mass casualty devices onto US soil.
In sum, only through a thorough review of a homeland defense policy can incidents like those of Sept. 11 be prevented from happening again.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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