When it comes to US missile defense, the Chinese remain unconvinced and unconvincing. Despite numerous attempts by Washington to reassure Beijing that it is not the intended target -- the latest coming this past weekend during Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to China -- Chinese leaders still find US missile defense plans unacceptable.
There's only one small problem with Beijing's unyielding approach: China's acceptance is not required. Nor is Washington compelled to take Beijing's concerns into account, especially if Chinese leaders refuse to enter into a constructive dialogue on the issue.
Don't get me wrong. I'm no fan of ballistic missile defense. As an American taxpayer, I can think of better uses for the billions of dollars that will be needed to develop a system that only has to fail once to be totally useless. But what I have figured out (and what Chinese leaders apparently still do not want to recognize) is that some type of missile defense system will be developed, my (and their) concerns notwithstanding.
US President George W. Bush's May 1 missile defense announcement was unequivocal.
"Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation," he argued, "defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation." As a result, the Defense Department was tasked to identify "near-term options that could allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited threats."
At the same time, however, President Bush promised "real consultations" in determining what America's future missile defense system would look like. "We are not presenting our friends and allies with unilateral decisions already made," Bush asserted, stating his administration's willingness to take the concerns of others, specifically China, into account.
There appeared to be a dual message in Bush's announcement. First, to those who were intent on convincing Washington that missile defense was a bad idea or impossible dream that should be abandoned, the message was -- simply stated -- "save your breath."
The US was going to have some form of missile defense; the "will we or won't we" debate was over. But, Bush was also saying that the form of missile defense to be pursued had not been determined and that he was willing to listen to, and to factor in to the final system design, the concerns of those most affected by this decision. To underscore his point, he sent high-ranking teams to Asia and Europe to discuss the issue and collect feedback.
The decision to pursue NMD has been highlighted by many international critics as another example of "US unilateralism" and there is some truth in this argument. But, few countries, in making what is essentially a sovereign national security decision, have taken as many pains as has the US (under Clinton as well as under Bush) to consult with allies and others every step of the way.
When Russia announced a few years back that it was abandoning its nuclear weapons "no first use" policy, no consultations were held. Likewise, when China decided to unilaterally expand its military presence in the South China Sea (Mischief Reef) or to dramatically increase the number of offensive missiles it has deployed within range not just of Taiwan but of all its neighbors in Southeast and Northeast Asia, it just did it. Yet both continue to lead the crusade against American "unilateralism."
By most accounts, Secretary Powell had constructive, substantive and generally positive discussions with Chinese officials, including President Jiang Zemin (
Beijing sent strong signals, according to Powell, that it was eager to get Sino-US relations back on track in the wake of the April EP3 incident and in anticipation of President Bush's October visit to Shanghai and Beijing. Chinese leaders even tolerated Powell's lectures on human rights and the rule of law. But, when it came to missile defense, Beijing's rhetoric still seemed fixated on the "trying to convince Washington not to proceed" mode.
What's needed is a serious Sino-US dialogue on what China's genuine security concerns are, given Washington's current inclination to listen -- provided, of course, that China is prepared to recognize that there are also legitimate US security concerns to be discussed.
While Secretary Powell continues to say that the currently-envisioned US missile defense plan is not aimed at negating China's nuclear deterrent capability, this is not a universally held view in Washington. If Beijing continues to insist on its current "all or nothing" approach, it could end up being faced with a more vigorous, threatening [to China] US missile defense system. Proponents for such a system are numerous, especially in the US defense establishment.
The time has come for Beijing to exhibit some "understanding" of US concerns, even as it pursues its own national security interests.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
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