What is the market for "one country, two systems" in Taiwan? Comparing the 16 percent support in an opinion poll published by the government a few days ago to the 30 or even 47 percent support shown in private surveys, it looks like the pollsters are fumbling around in the dark. How come poll data can show differences of 100 percent or even higher?
If we compare earlier official and private polls regarding the "one country, two systems" issue, we can see that the differences are created by both technical and non-technical factors in polling.
First, the technical factors are discrepancies created by differences in the ways in which the various polling organizations execute their surveys. Factors such as the database used for telephone polling, sampling methods, whether or not household sampling is applied, whether or not the formulation and sequence of questions are leading, whether or not the respondents are given hints about their choices and the name of the polling organization, are all things that will affect the outcome of the poll.
Second, even if each polling organization minimizes the influence of the above factors by the use of standardized procedures, discrepancies may still arise because of non-technical factors -- the way "one country, two systems" is presented in the survey. Looking at the many polls of the past, non-technical factors can be divided into three categories.
Questions in the first category do not provide a clear definition of "one country, two systems," but simply ask whether the
respondent supports "one country, two systems" as the model for handling future cross-strait relations. Examples are "Do you agree with cross-strait relations developing towards `one country, two systems?'" (from TVBS's poll center); "Can you accept `one country, two systems' as proposed by communist China as the way to peacefully solve the division between Taiwan and China" (the United Daily News opinion poll center); or "Could you accept cross-strait relations being handled according to `one country, two systems'?" (from the Public Opinion Research Foundation,
The second category adds comparisons with the Hong Kong and Macau model and other conditions to the questions asked. One example is, "Could you accept the `one country, two systems' concept proposed by China, ie the Hong Kong model, making the government of Taiwan a local government, dispensing with the country's name, national defense and diplomatic sovereignty, and accepting Chinese rule, but with Taiwan enjoying its current demo-cratic and economic systems?" (from the China Times). Questions presented in this way re-ceive result in less support than the previous category, but it still remains around 29 percent.
The third category consists of outsourced official polls. They normally clearly specify the contents of "one country, two sys-tems," meaning that some political conditions are added to the questions. Examples are "Could you accept the `one country, two systems' formula proposed by China, if it meant treating Taiwan as a local government, accepting Chinese rule and the non-existence of the government of the ROC?" (from the Mainland Affairs Council), or "Would you approve of the `one country, two systems' formula proposed by China, meaning that Taiwan may keep its current system and way of life, but that foreign policy would be handled by central government in Beijing?" (from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Support for "one country, two systems" in polls in which the questions are presented in this manner is low, largely concentrated between 10 and 16 percent.
When studying these surveys in depth, it is not difficult to see the tendency toward higher levels of support when the definition of "one country, two systems" is limited to economics or lesser aspects; but when it involves political aspects, we begin to see a strong tendency toward saying no. This view is supported by results from another poll, which shows 71.4 percent still say they want Taiwan to continue to develop foreign relations even if this means cross-strait relations will become tense. In other words, if we view "one country, two systems" from two respects -- with politics as the superstructure and non-political (economic) issues as the substructure -- public opinion will not lightly compromise on the former, while it leaves more room for compromise on the latter.
Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen (
Basically, apart from not having distanced itself from the nine points proposed 20 years ago by Ye Jianying (葉劍英, former chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress), Qian's elements stop at guaranteeing the economic benefits that the people of Taiwan already enjoy. Not one word is said about how to maintain Taiwan's political, religious and other freedoms. If we examine the polls sponsored by the MAC over the years from the above dual view of "one country, two systems," we can perhaps understand why public opinion against "one country, two systems" has remained around 70 to 80 percent for so long. If China does not want to come up with an answer more in line with democratic values when it comes to the question of the "one country, two systems" superstructure, it will have no market to speak of in Taiwan.
Jeff Wu is CEO of the Taipei-based Decision Making Research Center.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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