The Taiwan Solidarity Union
(
Even as it forms, the TSU has been the center of controversy because it has raised the "pro-Lee" banner, taken a "localiza-tion" platform, vowed to help the Chen Shui-bian (
However, after the party announced its name on July 24, the KMT, DPP and People First Party all said that the TSU's establishment will not have any major impact on them in the year-end election. In fact, people are still evaluating the prospects of this party.
Taiwan has a unique "single non-transferrable vote in multi-member districts" system in its legislative elections. For its presidential elections it adopts the plurality or "first-past-the-post" system. These differing systems are likely to generate two diamet-rically opposite forces in terms of shaping public opinion. A plurality system can easily generate centripetal incentives for candidates and causes them to seek support from a majority of the electorate.
Due to the psychological effects generated by strategic voting (known in Taiwan as "dumping one candidate to save another"), votes are likely to concentrate in the hands of two major candidates. On the other hand, a "single non-transferrable vote in multi-member districts" system generates centrifugal incentives for the candidates.
In other words, candidates will not move closer to the center, but will be scattered throughout the political spectrum and try to win the loyal support of specific minority groups that can give them enough votes to win.
In Taiwan's legislative elections, there are many reasons why voters pick a particular candidate. The social divisions formed by different views toward independence or unification with China is a key demarcation with the largest bases for partisan support. A listing of the major political parties in terms of their platforms on the independence-unification spectrum (from left to right): Taiwan Independence Party, DPP, KMT, PFP and New Party. The positioning of the TSU on the independence-unification spectrum -- as well as the party's strategy for partitioning different sectors of the electorate -- will affect its ability to develop a voter base. It will also determine which existing party will lose the largest chunk of its voter base to the TSU.
Throughout its preparatory phase, the TSU has stressed its position as a pro-localization, middle-way party. But it is increasingly being defined as farther to the left than the DPP on the independence-unification spectrum -- following the grand reception given to former president Lee Teng-hui (
Therefore, the party stands to have a bigger impact on the DPP's votes than on KMT and PFP votes. Certainly, the KMT -- not the DPP -- is happy to see this happen. Even if the TSU does not want to be defined this way, its ability to garner the support of middle-ground voters will be a decisive factor in its ability to develop a voter base.
In the year-end legislative elections, the union only needs to win more than 5 percent of all votes to surpass the party threshold and win a number of constituent and "at-large" seats.
But in fact, the strategic value of the number of seats won by the TSU does not depend entirely on how many seats it will snatch away from the DPP or the KMT. Rather, the value lies in whether it can help prevent the pan-KMT opposition alliance from winning a legislative majority.
If, as a result of the TSU's participation in the elections, the opposition alliance loses control over a legislative majority of more than 113 seats, then an "85 plus 35" partisan reshuffle is not entirely impossible.
If the opposition alliance still manages to win a majority despite the TSU's participation, then the party's post-election influence will be greatly reduced. The party achieves its optimum tactical goal when it manages to chip away votes from a good number of pan-KMT candidates and causes them to lose. For this reason, how the TSU will be positioned on the independence-unification spectrum will be of particular importance -- it will determine whose votes the TSU will chip away.
Wang Yeh-lih is a professor of political science at Tunghai University.
Translated by Francis Huang
In the first year of his second term, US President Donald Trump continued to shake the foundations of the liberal international order to realize his “America first” policy. However, amid an atmosphere of uncertainty and unpredictability, the Trump administration brought some clarity to its policy toward Taiwan. As expected, bilateral trade emerged as a major priority for the new Trump administration. To secure a favorable trade deal with Taiwan, it adopted a two-pronged strategy: First, Trump accused Taiwan of “stealing” chip business from the US, indicating that if Taipei did not address Washington’s concerns in this strategic sector, it could revisit its Taiwan
The stocks of rare earth companies soared on Monday following news that the Trump administration had taken a 10 percent stake in Oklahoma mining and magnet company USA Rare Earth Inc. Such is the visible benefit enjoyed by the growing number of firms that count Uncle Sam as a shareholder. Yet recent events surrounding perhaps what is the most well-known state-picked champion, Intel Corp, exposed a major unseen cost of the federal government’s unprecedented intervention in private business: the distortion of capital markets that have underpinned US growth and innovation since its founding. Prior to Intel’s Jan. 22 call with analysts
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) challenges and ignores the international rules-based order by violating Taiwanese airspace using a high-flying drone: This incident is a multi-layered challenge, including a lawfare challenge against the First Island Chain, the US, and the world. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defines lawfare as “controlling the enemy through the law or using the law to constrain the enemy.” Chen Yu-cheng (陳育正), an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies, at Taiwan’s Fu Hsing Kang College (National Defense University), argues the PLA uses lawfare to create a precedent and a new de facto legal
International debate on Taiwan is obsessed with “invasion countdowns,” framing the cross-strait crisis as a matter of military timetables and political opportunity. However, the seismic political tremors surrounding Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairman Zhang Youxia (張又俠) suggested that Washington and Taipei are watching the wrong clock. Beijing is constrained not by a lack of capability, but by an acute fear of regime-threatening military failure. The reported sidelining of Zhang — a combat veteran in a largely unbloodied force and long-time loyalist of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — followed a year of purges within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
RSS