Having witnessed milestone political transitions sweeping the world recently, we are now entering a new age. Rising on the horizon are, to say the least, a new American presidency, a new century, and a new millennium. A new dimension of interactions across the Taiwan Strait may also open up, which are currently in a state of flux.
How does Taipei perceive and how will Taipei manage cross-strait relations?
Current relations: compounded uncertainties
The actual tension that broke out between Beijing and Taipei in the fall of 1999 has since dissipated, but some still perceive a precarious cross-strait situation. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly expanding social interactions and heightened military competition.
Meanwhile, dynamic developments within both China and Taiwan have compounded the uncertainties looming across the Strait. A wide range of scenarios or "futuribles" on cross-strait relations -- from dramatic improvement to drastic deterioration -- have appeared in the realm of possibility.
On the mainland, the Beijing leadership is facing multiple domestic uncertainties. The rebound of GDP growth since January 1999, following a seven-year slide, seems to promise boundless economic opportunities. On the other hand, continuously growing social unrest partly caused by rampant corruption and partly by the state-owned enterprise overhaul is seriously threatening the stability of the communist regime. The 2002 leadership succession remains far from settled, not to mention recent signs of intensified political strife. All we know is this: By 2003, for the first time in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, a non-Moscow-trained national leader will emerge. The forthcoming ascension to WTO will also deepen the momentous socio-economic changes already in motion and perhaps past the point of no return. Meanwhile, ambitious military modernization signifies greater challenges for Beijing's relations with its neighbors.
In Taiwan, the completion of a quiet and bloodless revolution unfurled a full-fledged phase of democracy. Now a minority government is learning to cope with almost simultaneous eruptions of complications in the state and society that have long roots in the past. Ahead of all of us in Taiwan lie great challenges and opportunities both internally and externally. Our cross-strait policy must start from the reality and go forward. One important reality is, of course, how Beijing deals with us.
Beijing policy: Two-pronged campaign
Beijing's Taiwan policy has been remarkably consistent at the strategic level. Its basic tenets such as "one country, two systems," "peaceful unification" and non-renunciation of using force against Taiwan have remained unchanged for more than two decades. At the tactical level, however, Beijing has periodically adjusted its approaches. Since July 1999, four distinct periods have marked Beijing's tactical operations toward Taiwan.
-- Military Intimidations and Verbal Threats (July 9 - Sept. 21, 1999)
After former president Lee Teng-hui (
-- Verbal Threats (Sept. 21, 1999 - March 18, 2000)
The devastating 921 earthquake markedly reduced Beijing's militant behavior across the Strait. Some say the natural tragedy provided an exit for Beijing as firm international responses to Beijing's military intimidation exceeded its expectations. Others argue that Beijing did not want to hurt the feelings of Taiwanese suffering a gigantic natural disaster. However, Beijing's verbal threats against Taiwanese independence continued during the presidential election. A few days before the event on March 18, 2000, Beijing's threats culminated in Premier Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) acting like Marlon Brando in The Godfather. Some say that it helped candidate Chen to become President Chen with a 2.4 percent margin.
-- Passive Observation (March 18-June 20, 2000)
The victory of Chen, who had once advocated Taiwanese independence, apparently embarrassed Beijing. Instead of launching an "immediate war" as previously threatened by its semi-official scholars, Beijing reacted in a low-key and passive manner. "We are watching the deeds and listening to the words of Chen" was Beijing's standard statement during a three-month period of extensive fault-finding reviews and intensive comprehensive planning.
-- Two-Pronged Campaign (June 20, 2000 - present)
Starting June 20, 2000 when its deputy premier, Qian Qichen (錢其琛), went public with a less restrictive definition of "one China," the Chinese leadership began a well-coordinated, full-scale two-pronged campaign on Taiwan. One soft prong aims at winning "the hearts of Taiwanese people," and one hard prong seeks to put "appropriate [read indirect] pressure" on Taipei to accept Beijing' s precondition on resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijing's terms on unification.
The soft prong includes the following elements:
-- Softening of rhetoric without concrete change of behavior(so far).
-- Escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders in Taiwan such as legislators, former high-ranking officials (mostly from the now-opposition KMT), elected local officials (some belonging to the DPP), scholars, and media luminaries;
-- Mentioning preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the mainland.
-- Allowing a dramatically increased number of Chinese visitors to Taiwan since July 2000.
Meanwhile, the hard prong includes the following elements:
-- Continuing to conduct military exercises with no reduction of frequency, size, or content. These exercises have been held, however, away from sensitive areas of the Taiwan Strait, and announced by Beijing in a low-key manner rather than, as previously practiced, through the sensationalizing Hong Kong media;
-- Continuing strangulation of Taipei's international living-space with a new twist: launching a diplomatic war on Africa, the bastion of Taipei's full diplomatic ties.
-- Mobilizing Chinese overseas by forming organizations and staging conferences under the banner of "opposing independence and promoting unification."
-- Escalating Beijing's pressure on Washington not to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program and not to transfer arms to Taiwan by linking, more than before, the latter issue with Beijing's arms proliferation to Pakistan and the Middle East.
So far, Beijing seems to believe that its two-pronged maneuver is working, and shows no signs of altering it.
Taipei's policy: Constructive relationship
After the May 20, 2000 inauguration of President Chen Shui-bian (
-- We seek a structured and constructive cross-strait relationship. It should be a relationship with regularized communications and institutionalized interactions. It will be a mutually beneficial relationship, because a win-win relationship to us is not merely desirable but also do-able.
-- We hold no precondition for the resumption of cross-strait talks. Neither do we demand any preset agenda for cross-strait consultations. This attitude of ours contrasts distinctly with Beijing's insistence, before cross-strait talks can begin, on our acceptance of the "one China principle," however Beijing defines that.
-- We continue to express maximum goodwill. In his New Year TV address, Chen said that "both sides of the Strait are of the same family" (
-- We exercise absolute restraint on avoiding being seen as provocative. We are cautious not to give even the slightest impression that our words sound critical to Beijing, or our behavior can be construed as "trouble-making."
-- We take a pro-active approach on promoting socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. Early last June, only the second week into her new job, the Chairwoman of Mainland Affairs Council (陸委會), Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), went to inspect the offshore islands Kimen and Matsu. That launched the process for policy formulation on the "small three links" -- commercial, communication and transportation exchanges -- between the offshore islands and the adjacent Chinese province of Fujian. As of Jan. 1 this year, initial portions of the policy were implemented as scheduled. Some other policies governing cross-strait social and economic exchanges have been under review for possible relaxation in the future. In this regard, the administration has undertaken a series of policy initiatives:
-- Granting permission to Chinese journalists for temporary stay in Taiwan in late 2000;
-- Reviewing the "big three links" between Taiwan island proper and China, taking account of the forthcoming WTO memberships for both sides across the Taiwan Strait;
-- Reviewing cross-strait investment policies;
-- Planning to allow Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan in about six months time;
-- Building of internal consensus, which includes the establishment of the President's Advisory Group on Cross-strait Relations (跨黨派小組) led by the Nobel-laureate Lee Yuan-tseh (李遠哲).
Toward the mid-term future, we will seek to establish a framework for the discussion of political issues, which may cover the so-called "the question of a future one China."
We cannot sacrifice the national security of Taiwan while relaxing our exchange policy with the mainland. We strive to be pragmatic and creative in restructuring our relationship with China, socially, economically, and politically.
Across the Taiwan Strait, we look forward to seeing reciprocity of goodwill in concrete terms from Beijing in the near future. In the long run, we hope that deepened reforms on the mainland, not only in its economy but also in its society and its polity, will usher in the beginning of a new age, that of democracy and freedom for the Chinese people, as well as sustained prosperity and peace across the Taiwan Strait.
Lin Chong-Pin is the vice chairman of the Executive Yuan's Mainland Affairs Council.
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