On Dec. 28, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it was willing to cooperate with Taiwan's plan for the "small three links" (
It's obvious that China isn't willing to "put the ball in Taiwan's court" or raise expectations about the small three links. As long as Taiwan doesn't return to the "one China" principle, Beijing won't let Taiwan's new government enjoy any improvement in cross-strait relations. With the continued pressure, China hopes to force Taiwan to change its policies. In China's eyes, the small three links policy is only a delaying tactic by Taiwan to postpone the "big three links" (
China's classic negotiating strategy
In fact, ignoring the issue of the small three links raised by Taiwan is a classic example of China's tactic of "controlling the agenda." A US expert on China, Richard Solomon, discovered this in his research on China's negotiating behavior. When Richard Nixon stepped down because of the Watergate case, China didn't have a feeling for what the policies of his successor, Gerald Ford, would be toward China. Therefore, they adopted a tactic of pressuring Ford to try to force him to declare his position. The position they adopted was the passive stance used throughout all of 1975, when they refused to discuss any other issues during Ford's visit to China.
At that time, Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) held the post of vice premier. When he accepted an interview with the media in June of that year, he made a special point of saying, "whether or not there is something in particular to discuss, Ford is welcome to pay a visit to Beijing at the end of the year."
In September in New York, Henry Kissinger made a cautious inquiry to China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qiao Guanhua (
On the other hand, if a topic is one that Beijing doesn't want to discuss, they also have ways of controlling the agenda and making it impossible to broach. In 1975, Kissinger once indicated to Mao Zedong (
Solomon has also pointed out that China has a habit of using the media to "set the stage" and trumpet their policies. Their principle for deciding whether to let the media report on an issue is based on whether media exposure will be of help in negotiations. Sometimes they use the media to heat up the debate on an issue, and sometimes they put out pessimistic news that "negotiations have stalled" to pressure the other party. At still other times they intentionally take advantage of certain news events to provoke the other party and change the direction of negotiations.
'Fait accompli' tactic
After understanding China's negotiating strategy, we can take another, more penetrating look at the interaction over the issue of the "small three links." At first, when Taiwan played its cards hoping to advance the "small three links," China paid no heed. Like plunging a fist into cotton, there was no response whatsoever. This was both sides wrestling for the right to control the agenda. In the past, when Taiwan was using a "fait accompli" tactic, there were both successes and failures. The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF, 海基會) is a case of success. When it was first established, China was unwilling to dance to Taiwan's tune. But later they realized that if they didn't have dealings with the SEF, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would have no channels for communication. Therefore they established the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS, 海協會) to sing their part. However, when we tried to use the same "fait accompli" tactic to advance our plan for an offshore trans-shipping center (
Taiwan plays the small links card
When Taiwan advanced the small three links, China wanted to cast an impression of Taiwan carrying on a one-sided affair and working to no avail. But later they discovered that Taiwan seems to have a different interpretation of the "small three links." Taiwan claims that the small three links can serve as the beginning of a "confidence-building mechanism" in military affairs, and also constantly emphasizes that the plan for the "small three links" is a friendly overture to China. Therefore if China doesn't respond to our goodwill, how can relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait be pushed forward in the future? These interpretations changed the nature of our "card."
China also discovered that if they continued to fail to actively respond to Taiwan's friendly overtures, then in the future, when they want to exert pressure on Taiwan, their legitimacy would be gradually eroded.
What's more, Taiwan had already set the stage for all Western media to compete in their coverage of the first direct encounter across the Strait. If the Beijing authorities did not jump on the stage and join the performance, Taiwan alone would reap all the results of the publicity. Therefore, the best approach was for the Beijing authorities to jump on the stage and lay down its cards -- saying they would be willing to cooperate, but the matter has to be negotiated between non-governmental entities in accordance with the principle of "one country's internal matter."
This can either be a goodwill gesture or a provocation, but the purpose is quite obvious: to regain the initiative on the "small three links" issue. Because non-governmental negotiations do not mean a reopening of official channels for dialogue, Beijing will continue to control the rhythm of cross-strait dialogue.
What comes next will depend on how Taiwan interprets Beijing's pitch. "Interpretation" is an important skill in negotiations. From 1977 to 1978, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance handled the normalization talks with China. Later on, Beijing did not dare to trust Vance because of his lawyer-like approach to problems and his reluctance to take a stronger stance against the Soviet Union. Therefore, after one meeting with Vance, Beijing gave word to President Jimmy Carter: "Sino-US relations are not a diplomatic issue, but a political one," and therefore require long-term strategic considerations. That was "interpretation." Its purpose was to let the White House take over China affairs from the hands of career diplomats in the State Department. Beijing's strategy later proved successful, as national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski took over the leading role in China policy from the hands of Cyrus Vance. Of course, it also had to do with the power struggle between Brzezinski and Vance at the time, but Beijing's "political, not diplomatic" interpretation undoubtedly played a catalytic role.
Ball in Taiwan's court
Therefore, the ball will be back in Taiwan's court as Beijing changes its attitude toward the "small three links." Should Taiwan respond by "singing its own tune" (Beijing defines the small three links as a local affair, but we interpret it according to our own definition)? Or should it respond with a "delay tactic" ("domestic affairs" is neither concrete nor clear enough and can be discussed later; but we can first discuss the the details of the "small three links"); or a "chicken and egg" argument (without first building mutual trust through the "small three links", how can we reach a consensus on "one country's internal matter"?); or a "bigger incentive" (simultaneously planning the big and small three links, and letting them become parallel policies)?
But no matter how Taiwan responds, it will have to consider the overall negotiation strategy. It will have to watch the publicity effects of any card it lays down. Beijing places considerable importance on publicity skills when it comes to negotiations, and Taiwan should not stay idle and look on. Now that Taiwan has already set up a media stage to trumpet the "small three links," it must make sure that the stage is not carrying "two shows." Taiwan will also have to try its best to control the agenda and rhythm of cross-strait interaction. This will be a major test of Taiwan's wisdom.
Liu Pi-jung is a professor at the department of political science, Soochow University.
Translated by Ethan Harkness and Francis Huang
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