The Chinese authorities in the mainland now say that China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS,
Really? Once again I carefully flipped through my copy of China's Taiwan Problem: A Reader for Cadres (
Refusing to discuss the "one China" principle: According to the record of documents in that Reader for Cadres, starting in March of 1992 the two sides entered into working negotiations and furthermore discussed preparations for opening the Wang-Koo talks (
The documents in the Reader for Cadres record the following: Due to the insistence of ARATS, the Taiwan side had difficulty avoiding making a clear statement of its attitude toward the principle of one China in the course of working negotiations. Starting in April (1992), they researched a counter-strategy in their National Unification Council (NUC,
Communist China unilaterally makes interpretations out of context: The documents record Communist China's own unilateral conclusion: "Reflecting the fact that Taiwan's authorities have already declared their position, saying `both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain the principle of one China,' on August 27 ARATS released a statement through its director. It confirms that both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain the principle of one China and states that abiding by the principle of one China has already become a consensus between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in working negotiations."
Note that China's document only took the first sentence from the NUC's statement of its basic viewpoint. It completely ignores the proviso that follows, drawing a unilateral conclusion from a statement taken out of context, namely that, "abiding by the principle of one China has already become a consensus between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait." One might venture the question, since the NUC stated "each side interprets the meaning differently," how could a consensus have been achieved on the "one-China principle"? Now take a look at how China's documents recording the Hong Kong meeting. "From October 27 to 29 of 1992, the two sides entered into working negotiations in Hong Kong. The SEF representatives proposed a total of eight different formulation schemes regarding the problem of the one-China principle ... One such plan was, `While the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are in the process of seeking reunification, although both sides maintain the principle of one China, their understanding of the meaning of one China differs.' On November 16, ARATS sent a letter to the SEF. (Author's note: Obviously no consensus was reached in the late October meeting in Hong Kong. Thus ARATS only replied by letter half a month after the meeting ended.) It agreed that each side state verbally, `both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain the one-China principle,' and raised the key point of the ARATS verbal formulation -- `Both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain the one-China principle and will work diligently to seek unification. However, in the working negotiations between the two sides, the political implications of `one China' won't be involved.'"
From this passage, we can see that the SEF had twice raised the issue that the two sides in fact have a different understanding of the political implications of the one-China principle. The difference is -- when you speak of "one China" it means the PRC, and when we speak of "one China" it means the ROC. This is a fundamental difference. How could a consensus have been reached about the one-China principal? The ROC couldn't possibly accept the PRC as the "one China", and the reverse is equally true, is it not?
However, the book China's Taiwan Problem: A Reader for Cadres, comes right away to the following surprising conclusion. "Comparing the key points of formulations by ARATS with the proposed schemes put forward by the SEF, the areas of agreement are that both sides declared that they seek to unify the country and steadfastly support the one-China principle. The differences are that the SEF emphasized `differences in perception' while ARATS insisted that the political implications of one China not be involved in the working discussion. Both sides then achieved a consensus in the working negotiations by each separately verbally formulating that, `both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain the principle of one China.' Later the Taiwan side said that consensus had been achieved on, `one China, with each side having its own interpretation.' This was even twisted to become, "the meaning of one China, with each side having its own interpretation. This does not accord with the reality at the time."
Twisting the original idea, a depraved technique: The compilation of this book two years ago in mainland China was obviously for the depraved and self-interested purpose of quoting certain statements out of context six years after the fact. Unilaterally recording the conclusion that "a consensus was achieved" is nothing but tyrannical behavior, imposing one's way on others and failing to acknowledge differing views.
If the facts were really as mainland China now claims and both sides of the Taiwan Strait achieved consensus in 1992 on maintaining the one-China principle, then that would have been a tremendous initial success achieved in the first meeting between the two sides. This ought to have been a great event receiving extensive written coverage. Why wasn't it written up in a formal agreement? Why didn't we see the release of a joint communique publicly announcing the fact to the citizens on both sides of the Taiwan Strait as well as those countries that are concerned about peace in the region? At the very least, ARATS and the SEF should have signed an official document together, making two copies and each putting one on record for reference. But now, there isn't anything of the sort. Where does this "92 consensus" come from?
Furthermore, after the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong and before 1998, when was it ever repeated that consensus was reached on the one-China principle, either by the leaders of the CPC or in PRC documents regarding relations across the Taiwan Strait or in communications with the Taiwanese authorities? I consulted related documentary materials from mainland China, for example the speech titled "Continue to struggle in order to promote the great enterprise of completing the unification of the motherland," made by Jiang Zemin on January 30, 1995 and also known as, "Jiang's eight points." Nowhere in the speech does it say that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait reached a consensus on the one-China principle at the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong. We only see that when he formulates his own opinion, he says that, "maintaining the one-China principle is the basis and the prerequisite for realizing peaceful unification." He goes on to say, "under the premise of one China, any issue can be discussed, including negotiating with Taiwan in the formal cross-strait style about ..." And later adds, "under the principle of one China, the two sides can first enter into talks to formally end the state of hostility between them."
May we ask, if a consensus was already reached on the one-China principle in 1992, then aren't "ending the state of hostility," and so on, all things that could have been discussed as early as 1993? And why did Jiang Zemin wait till 1995 to put forth his opinion?
Now take a look at Jiang Zemin's speech, "Pushing forward the peaceful unification of the motherland," delivered at the 15th National Party Congress in September of 1997. He is still saying we need to do this and that "under the one-China principle." There is no mention of wanting Taiwan to observe any "92 consensus".
I also examined Premier Li Peng's (
What consensus came from the 1992 meeting?: Is it really possible that Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qian Qichen and the leaders in the State Council all completely forgot that a consensus was reached on the one-China principle at the 1992 meeting between ARATS and the SEF in Hong Kong? In the end, the so-called "one-China principle" was only verbally formulated by each side separately at that meeting. As for the political meaning of "one China," you say the PRC, and we say the ROC, with each side singing its own tune. So is it the PRC? Or the ROC? What consensus is there worth mentioning?
Recently representative groups from each political party in the ROC have visited Beijing. According to announcements from Beijing, both sides have reached a consensus on the one-China principle. I have specially cited the above materials from the PRC, hoping that those in Taiwan's political circles will examine them to help decide how Taiwan should respond to the issue of the so-called "92 consensus."
Kam Yiu-yu (
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