In his speech to celebrate the founding of the ROC, Taiwan's newly elected president, Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), made clear his willingness to seek "eternal peace" with China. For all Chen's optimism, the traditional foundations that underpinned the relations across the Taiwan Strait are crumbling rapidly: China recently described the "situation in the Taiwan Strait as complicated and grim." The prospects of a major miscalculation leading to a military confrontation are increasing as result.
True, there are certainly a host of factors restricting the possibility of an eruption of tensions across the Strait. China and Taiwan have a mutually beneficial and growing economic relationship: between 1991 and 1997 Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested US$18.3 billion in 38,000 projects in China and there is no sign that this cash inflow is about to stop.
Politicians on both sides also tend to be a teeny bit more cautious than their fiery rhetoric suggests: China has tended to be pretty risk averse when it comes to picking fights with its neighbors. Soon after coming to power Chen promised that he would not declare independence as long as China didn't use force against the island. Both sides also understand full-well the importance of retaining good relations with the US, which acts as a constraint on their behavior.
On the other hand, the room for diplomatic maneuver in cross-strait relations has contracted rapidly in recent years. Specifically, mutual anxiety has forced both sides to clarify (often publicly) their positions on the issue of "one China," when it probably would have been better for all concerned if it had remained a grey area. Beijing believes that Taipei has willfully moved away from the 1992 agreement that they reached in Singapore -- when they agreed on the principal of "one-China" but adopted different interpretations of what this meant. Additionally, it reckons that Taiwan is edging towards independence, with the help of the US. Its response has been to harden its position on the requirement that discussions between China and Taiwan can only take place if Taiwan first accepts the notion of "one China."
Taiwan's view, not surprisingly, is rather different. Although the new government is trying to revive the "spirit of 1992" (九二精神), most Taiwanese politicians believe that at heart the island should be rewarded for its recent economic and democratic achievements. This has been reflected in Taipei's sustained efforts to gain membership of the UN and other international bodies, and the refusal of Chen's government to accept China's definition on "one China" as the basis for negotiations. Taiwan is also bugged by the prospect of a warming in ties between the US and China, and the possibility that Washington and Beijing may try and strike a deal on the island's future above their heads. These concerns reached a high-point following President Bill Clinton's visit to China in July 1998.
Domestic developments on both sides have only served to complicate the matter further, the most notable of which has been the rise of Chinese nationalism that has accompanied the declining relevance of the Communist party. The democratization of Taiwan is also posing a challenge to established patterns of political interaction across the Strait.
The election of Chen obviously came as a blow to China, particularly as it had urged the island's voters not to vote for him. Looking to the future, the prospect of having to deal with democratically elected politicians with no link to China is certain to fill the Chinese leaders with dread: the days of crusty Nationalists and crusty Communists, many of whom had grown up together in China in the early years of the 20th century, sitting down and debating Taiwan's future are over. Lastly, Taiwan's politicians are now beholden to their voters, which in time will complicate the way in which policy towards China is made.
Changes in the military balance of power across the Strait have the potential to add to the heady mix. Although China certainly does not have the wherewithal to invade Taiwan, it is nevertheless building up its short and medium range ballistic missiles on the coast opposite to Taiwan. Beijing has also purchased sophisticated fighter aircraft, ships and submarines from the Russians. That, in turn, prompted the US Department of Defense to caution that China could have the edge by 2010.
It may happen even sooner than that. Taiwan's armed forces are not all they're cracked up to be. Presently, the main challenges include problems with logistics, training, systems integration, doctrinal development and morale. Also, the willingness, not only of Taiwan's largely conscript army, but the population in general, to resist even a limited attack from China is questionable. Whether or not those Western leaders who have been salivating over the prospect of access to China's markets in the last 10 years, would try and evict Chinese forces from Taiwan, as they did with Saddam Hussein's forces in Kuwait, is also open to doubt.
Currently, the worse case scenario is one in which Chen's government refuses to agree to Beijing's demand that it accept the notion of "one China" before it enters into negotiations. Against the backdrop of rising nationalist sentiment back home, China then decides to put both Taiwanese and international resolve to the test. However, to the surprise of outside observers, rather than attempting a full-scale invasion or a lengthy blockade, China instead responds with a series of quick missile strikes and attacks by special forces, thus exploiting the frailties of Taiwan's armed forces, and making it harder for the international community to respond. With the morale of both its military and civilian populations crumbling and unable to bring China back to the negotiating table Taipei has little choice but to capitulate.
That would be a disaster, not only for Taiwan and China, but for peace and stability in the region, to boot. However, with most of the international community looking the other way and Beijing and Taipei doing their best to paint themselves into a corner, the prospects of a miscalculation leading to war are nearer than we think.
Damon Bristow is head of the Asia program at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies in Whitehall, London.
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